The Tide Turns Between Offense and Defense

The main way to connect East Africa's eastern and western coasts still had to be through railways. Of course, waterway connections were not impossible, but they were absolutely beyond what East Africa could achieve at present.

That would mean linking the Zambezi River basin and the Congo River basin, requiring the construction of vast numbers of water conservancy projects to improve navigational conditions between the two basins.

Such a project would have been basically impossible even in the twenty-first century. The Zambezi River basin alone was exceptionally difficult to tame.

Of course, using railways and roads to link these fragmented inland river routes would not have been too difficult for East Africa.

But all such ideas were still far too distant for East Africa at present. Even after the nationwide Water Conservancy Construction of East Africa's seventies and eighties, many natural waterways remained unmodified. Conquering these rivers and waters would likely take centuries to accomplish step by step.

August 4, 1888.

After ensuring that the British Royal Navy in the east and north showed no unusual movements, the East African Navy detached a fleet of two capital ships, six gunboats, and ten auxiliary vessels, setting out in grand force toward Mozambican waters.

Faced with this "powerful" naval force, the Allied forces' navy had no way to respond. Their vessels hurriedly withdrew to Durban and Maputo to preserve their strength.

The sea route from eastern East Africa to New Hamburg City was restored. Although the Allied forces' navy still struck at and launched sneak attacks against the route, they could no longer amount to much.

At the same time, as one side waned and the other waxed, the East African Navy repaid the Allied forces in kind. Just as the Allied forces had previously blockaded New Hamburg City, East Africa