"Benguela had to be taken, but with the lessons from the last East Portugal War, Benguela would probably be even harder to capture. So we could not fix our eyes on Benguela alone," Hullmond analyzed.
Benguela had been occupied by East Africa once before, so the Portuguese had surely learned their lesson. Moreover, this time, there were no brother units to coordinate with against Benguela's defenders. This was also one of the 421st Division's difficulties.
As a mobile force, the 421st Division was actually inferior to regular infantry divisions in firepower. After all, there was gain where there was loss; to achieve mobility, a certain degree of firepower had to be sacrificed.
Of course, after the long war in Letania Province, the 421st Division had long since become less pure in character. To contend with the Portuguese Army, the 421st Division had also adopted many tactics used by regular infantry divisions.
Furthermore, although East African cavalry divisions were somewhat lacking in firepower compared with other regular infantry divisions, they could still crush the Portuguese Army.
Portugal's finances simply could not provide its military with large quantities of advanced weapons. Meanwhile, as East Africa's military industry developed, costs fell and output rose, and over the years it had continuously improved the army's firepower and weapon performance.
Of course, what mattered even more was whether the fighting took place on "home soil." If Angola and Mozambique beside East Africa had instead been the Portuguese homeland, the situation of the war would probably have been vastly different.
Although the Portuguese homeland had declined severely, it was not particularly weak by European standards overall. Its domestic military industry in particular should have been capable of fighting East Africa.
However, Portugal's domestic military industry was certainly inferior to East Africa's, because its military and civilian