Spending a few thousand yen on a well-made 16-bit cartridge became the more cost-effective choice.
Development tools for the old platforms had long since matured, code optimization had been pushed to the limit, and developers could produce highly polished works at relatively low cost.
This low-risk, high-output business model was the cornerstone on which many small and midsize companies depended for survival.
Time moved on to late November.
Sega dropped the blockbuster product Toy Story onto the Jupiter platform right on schedule.
Riding the east wind of the Hollywood animated film, the game triggered a buying frenzy in both the North America and Japan markets.
Limited-edition consoles with Buzz Lightyear paint jobs were bid up to high prices on the secondhand market.
Just when the industry estimated that third-party companies would be completely drowned by this frenzy, the actual sales situation took on a different shape.
The hot sales of Toy Story did not deal a serious blow to the 16-bit and handheld markets.
This family-friendly game from Sega had cut into nontraditional player groups, essentially expanding the pie of the entire game market.
For players who already owned 16-bit consoles and were used to traditional hardcore gameplay, Toy Story's appeal had an upper limit.
They still held the cash they had prepared and searched the shelves for the war chess or hardcore action games they wanted.
Moreover, players' budgets during the year-end spending season were usually fairly ample.
Sega's one or two games alone still could not completely wring their wallets dry.
After buying Toy Story as a tool for the whole family to enjoy together, parents then picked out an MD cartridge for their own personal entertainment and pastime; this was the real consumption path for many families.
Channel merchants keenly captured this mixed consumption model. They placed