The history of football tactics was a tragic tale of new waves constantly crashing down on the old and killing them off.
Yesterday's innovators gradually became the mainstream, only to be replaced by a new generation of innovators, driving the development of football tactics forward.
At the turn of the century, many fans would remember the madness of the Bundesliga, Florentino's Galácticos, Manchester United's hard-fought treble, and the fading glow of Serie A's little World Cup.
But few would remember that an unassuming little team had reached the UEFA Champions League final in two consecutive seasons.
Although they lost to footballing giants both times and became a byword for heartbreak, they were undoubtedly one of the most memorable teams around the turn of the century, while also playing the role of tactical innovators in European football.
That team came from La Liga. Their name was Valencia.
Italian manager Ranieri brought the framework of an Italian defensive system to Valencia, and his successor, Argentine manager Héctor Cúper, took the team's achievements a step further.
Many fans remembered Cooper for his time in charge of Inter Milan, especially his feud with Ronaldo.
Conservative, stubborn, and unfeeling: that was probably every fan's stereotypical impression of Cooper.
In the past, whenever Gao Shen searched for Cooper online, a photo would always pop up showing a stiff, old-fashioned figure with white hair, black-rimmed glasses, and an utterly stubborn expression. It undoubtedly kept reinforcing that impression of Cooper among those who came later.
But in fact, whether at Real Mallorca or Valencia, Cooper was a tactical innovator in every sense of the word.
Building on Agnelli's foundations, he created the 4-4-2 Diamond Midfield for Valencia. It gave tactical development in European football an enormous boost, and managers, including Ferguson, followed Valencia's example and adopted a diamond midfield.
Cooper's approach not only helped Valencia reach the UEFA Champions League final in two consecutive seasons, but also produced a group of outstanding stars, including Gerard and Mendieta.
The same philosophy won him the favor of Inter Milan president Moratti, leading to his later entanglements with Ronaldo.
But was Cooper's tactical innovation merely a matter of adjusting where his players stood?
To the ordinary fan, it certainly seemed that way, but in reality, it was a revolution in tactical philosophy. It marked European football's formal stride away from the old sweeper and man-marking tactics toward the concept of zonal defending outlined by Sacchi.
Football tactics had previously emphasized possession and players, but now a third element was being added: space.
In possession, the question was how to stretch the space as much as possible, pull the opposition's defense around, and create more openings for the attack; out of possession, it was how to compress the space as much as possible, maintain a compact defensive shape, and leave fewer gaps exposed.
Gerard developed as a lone defensive midfielder under Cooper's system and attracted Barcelona's attention. They signed him for an astronomical fee, only for him to lose his way amid the confusion at Camp Nou.
Mendieta subsequently transferred to Lazio as well, where he struggled terribly to adapt, and his career went into a nosedive.
This was certainly no coincidence.
If Cooper had led Europe's tactical revolution during his time at Valencia, then his successor, Benítez, took that innovation a step further and turned it into a consensus across Europe and even the world.
4-2-3-1, a double pivot, and a high press!
Benítez clearly saw that the lone defensive midfielder in a 4-4-2 diamond did not provide enough protection for the spaces on either side of the back line. At the time, European football had plenty of wide attacking midfielders like Zidane and Nedvěd, who were highly dangerous when attacking those channels.
So he took off a striker and adopted a double pivot. After selling Gerard, Valencia had brought in Baraja, and together with the homegrown Albelda, he gave Benítez the makings of one of European football's most classic defensive midfield pairings of the previous decade.
With four lines, control of space reached an entirely new level. The team could advance to attack or fall back to defend. With this approach, Benítez led Valencia to the La Liga title and Liverpool to the Istanbul Miracle in the UEFA Champions League final.
And the following year, in 2007, Liverpool would reach the UEFA Champions League final again.
It was fair to say that the 4-2-3-1 was a very advanced approach at the moment.
From the perspective of 2006, Chelsea manager Mourinho's 4-3-3 was ahead of its time, but it made extremely high demands of its players and was simply unsuitable for most teams. Generally, only strong teams used it. The 4-2-3-1 was different: it was far more universally applicable.
At the very least, the current Real Madrid could not play a 4-3-3.
Once upon a time, Real Madrid had also wanted to use a double pivot.
From Florentino signing Makelele, Flávio, and Celades in one go—all three defensive midfielders who had performed superbly in La Liga—to established players like Gravesen and Pablo García arriving later, it was clear that Real Madrid had not failed to see the trend. So why was their defense still so poor?
The answer was simple: superstars.
That raised another question: why did superstars have such a great impact on Real Madrid's tactics?
Was it merely because they did not actively contribute to the defense?
Yes, but also no.
It was 2006, and the World Cup in Germany was just around the corner.
Many fans would surely wonder why Zidane performed so brilliantly at the World Cup in Germany, yet fell short of expectations at Real Madrid.
Was he deliberately saving his strength at club level?
Only Zidane himself probably knew whether he had deliberately held back, but he played completely different roles at Real Madrid and on the France national team.
At the World Cup in Germany, France used a 4-2-3-1 Formation, with Makelele and Vieira as the double pivot. Zidane did not play on the left side of the attack, but as an attacking midfielder.
The 4-2-3-1 was a very balanced formation, particularly good at bringing out the attacking midfielder's abilities. Zidane was like a fish in water in that tactical system. He did not even need to worry about defending, because two defensive midfielders held the fort behind him.
In that setup, Zidane's abilities were brought out to the fullest.
So could Real Madrid play it?
Compared with France's World Cup lineup, Real Madrid had Ronaldo against Henry up front, Raúl against Malouda on the left, and Robinho against Ribéry on the right. It did not seem like such an impossible comparison, did it?
Even in defensive midfield, Gravesen was an established Premier League player, Pablo García was an established La Liga player, and there was also Beckham, a master of the long pass who had done very well filling in as a defensive midfielder. Any way one looked at it, they could give it a try.
So why didn't Real Madrid try it?
The answer was simple: superstars again!
First, Ronaldo's range of movement and individual ability were no longer what they had been, and he simply could not pose the same threat as Henry. Second, Roberto Carlos loved attacking and was at his best charging all the way down the flank. Everyone knew that for Carlos to be dangerous, space had to be left for him up front.
That created a problem. When Carlos surged forward, the player on the left side of the attack would move inside, encroaching on the attacking midfielder's operating space. That alone would not have been a big deal, but the crucial issue was that if the attack failed after Carlos pushed forward and the opposition counterattacked, Real Madrid would struggle to put an effective defensive system together.
That was because Real Madrid were still using the same old zonal marking, with their defense placing greater emphasis on individual performances than on functioning as a team system. It was because Carlos could not get back, and because superstars like Ronaldo, Zidane, and Robinho did not actively track back.
If one or two players failed to track back, the team could still find a way to compensate. But if none of the attacking players tracked back, how could they cover for them?
That was why, over the past few years, Real Madrid's defense had been riddled with holes. Even though they had replaced defender after defender and bought one deep-lying defensive midfielder after another, the result remained the same. It had made no difference whatsoever.
Without changing the defensive system and the overall tactical philosophy, replacing players was a waste of effort, whoever came in.
Gao Shen was well aware of the problems Real Madrid currently faced.
Before transmigrating, he had been a fan. He had only known that the problem lay with the superstars, but why was it the superstars?
He did not understand.
Now he understood a little, so he was going to start working on a solution.
He chose to read the Benítez collection, starting with Benítez's tactics and team building, especially the improvements he made after taking over Valencia and the overhaul he carried out after taking over Liverpool. All of it was extremely valuable to Gao Shen now.
After spending the night in the library reading through those two major case studies and chewing them over repeatedly, Gao Shen still did not understand many things, but his tactical understanding as a whole had risen a level, and he could see Real Madrid's current problems more clearly.
Real Madrid were sick, and the disease had reached their vital organs.
This was no longer something medicine and injections could cure. It would take major surgery that cut to the bone.
The defense in particular needed a complete overhaul of its system.
Without reforming the defensive system, signing more superstars would do no good.
From Samuel to Woodgate, and then the future World Player of the Year Cannavaro, Real Madrid had brought in defenders and even made a point of hiring Capello, the celebrated Italian manager known for his conservatism. Their defense had improved, and they had won the league title, but they still were not solid enough.
And the very reason Capello succeeded at Real Madrid was that he used a double pivot.
That was exactly what Gao Shen wanted to do.
Real Madrid's problem had never been their attack, but their defense.
Or rather, how to organize their defense better while maintaining an attacking threat.
Real Madrid were not short of good players either. Take Gravesen: he had been the heart of Everton's midfield. Many people thought he was a brute. Yes, he did look fierce, but in reality, he was a very strong passer and playmaker.
Pablo García was also an established La Liga player. The fact that Real Madrid had taken an interest in him was itself proof of his ability.
What Gao Shen needed to do now was devise a suitable tactic and bring this group of players together into an effective fighting force.
The 4-2-3-1 was the tactic Gao Shen wanted. He believed it was also the most suitable one for Real Madrid at present.
Although it would sacrifice some attacking power, it would bring defensive solidity in return, making Real Madrid more competitive.
Besides, since Gao Shen had decided to go head-to-head with the superstars led by the Brazilian contingent, the team's attack would be affected no matter what. In that case, he might as well weaken the attack of his own accord and strengthen the defense.
With the tactics decided, the next step was to select the lineup.