Although America tried to avoid directly intervening in Europe's disputes under the isolationist foreign policy established by George Washington, the reality was that quite a few Americans, because of old "grudges," joined either the Anti-French Coalition or the French army.
Soldiers were not legislators sitting in Parliament. They often carried blood debts on their backs, or sought revenge for family and friends. But those were personal actions, not something done in the capacity of diplomats.
Just as William Pitt the Younger had made so many promises to the Irish during the union of Britain and Ireland, when the time came to fulfill them, the king vetoed them. Unable to keep his promises, he could only resign, yet the overall situation had already been set. Besides, an American president needed Parliament's approval to wage war abroad, but if the president deployed troops for foreign military operations lasting no more than sixty days, Parliament's approval was unnecessary.
In other words, Thomas Jefferson could use presidential authority to send two thousand regular soldiers to Europe for sixty days. Once the sixty days were up, they could leave like Cinderella before the magic vanished at midnight. Was Bonaparte supposed to come knocking with the "crystal slippers" they left behind and demand an explanation?
They had not failed to honor the agreement, but was fulfilling it this way any different from not fulfilling it at all?
The Americans might as well provide some economic support instead. For example, they could establish a cotton trading center in Le Havre and stop shipping cotton to Liverpool—provided they were not afraid that the British Navy would come "fishing" for it.
What mattered most to Britain was control of the seas. When Napoleon crossed the Dover Strait, Parliament of the United Kingdom was also debating whether troops should be