Of course, the premise was that the Ottoman Empire joined Germany's side just as it had in his previous life. That way, aside from the Suez Canal, East Africa could directly make use of the Persian Gulf, then transport supplies to Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire through the Baghdad Railway.
After all, the Suez Canal was under British control and carried a certain degree of risk. Even so, East Africa held a greater advantage than the United States, because the United States had only the Atlantic Ocean route to choose from, while East Africa had three trade routes. In a more extreme scenario, East Africa could open a land trade route through the Sahara to the Mediterranean coast, though the difficulty was immense and it offered no cost advantage.
Naturally, all of this depended on history proceeding along its original course, on East African industry developing, and on a powerful navy safeguarding East Africa's economic interests.
The fundamental guarantee that had allowed the United States to profit from both sides during the war in his previous life was its comparatively formidable naval strength. Otherwise, the British Navy and French Navy had been entirely capable of cutting off trade between the United States and the Central Powers.
One had to know that after the First World War ended, the American Navy's total tonnage had already approached half that of the British Navy, nearing five hundred thousand tons. During the early and middle stages of the war, the United States had remained neutral and had not entered the conflict. Thus, the true guarantee behind its ability to profit from both sides during the war had been its powerful naval strength.
This held tremendous reference value for Ernst. Therefore, before a full-scale war erupted in Europe, the strength of the East African Army