The core of the German government's discussions on East Africa remained the desire to draw East Africa into its own camp. If it could bind a great power with a population exceeding one hundred million and a territory of over ten million square kilometers to itself, the benefits to Germany would be self-evident.
Wilhelm II said with some dissatisfaction, "We have constantly shown goodwill toward East Africa in the past, yet the East African government has remained ambiguous in its attitude. The Foreign Ministry must think of more ways to make East Africa lean toward us as much as possible. Best of all, we should sign an alliance treaty."
Bettmann, the Chancellor, was also quite troubled by the East African government's slipperiness. He said helplessly, "In recent years, we have continually tried to penetrate East Africa, but with very little effect. East Africa is unlike those countries in Central and Eastern Europe; even when they accept our investments, the restrictions are relatively numerous."
"That is not even what worries me most. East Africa's greatest problem lies in its economic system, which is inherently exclusionary. If we wish to use the economy to influence public opinion within East Africa, it is almost impossible. Nor can we effectively support forces inclined toward us."
Economic aid and loans had never been free for the taking, especially aid and loans from great powers. Moreover, Germany was unlike Britain: its economic aid placed greater emphasis on political returns and cared relatively little about profits.
In Central and Eastern Europe, because their economies were relatively backward, it was difficult to accumulate funds for industrial development. Even semi-industrialized countries like the Austro-Hungarian Empire were no exception.
Through their penetration into these regions, German capital became tied to local forces through shared interests. Thus, when it came to