Islands naturally possessed defensive advantages, able to isolate the risks brought by land powers. Mainland Britain had exploited this very point to stir up storms across the whole of Europe, while Britain only needed to maintain naval superiority to ensure the safety of its homeland.
The same held true in the Persian Gulf region. Britain occupied several of the most important islands in the Persian Gulf, such as Qeshm Island, the largest by area; Greater Tunb Island, Lesser Tunb Island, and Abu Musa Island, which controlled the Strait of Hormuz; and Bahrain Island within the Persian Gulf.
Britain essentially used these islands as bases to control the political situation throughout the Persian Gulf, so it certainly would not cede them to East Africa.
As for the Pirate Coast, namely the UAE, and Qatar, they were second-tier powers under British control in the Persian Gulf region. Qatar was a peninsula and lay beside Bahrain, so Britain would not readily let it go either.
As for the other places, although British influence was great, they were not directly controlled by Britain. Even the Pirate Coast and Qatar had, to some extent, merely been conveniently seized by Britain because they were of too little value.
The only local industry of any value was pearl diving. Qatar and Bahrain had once actually belonged to the same country, but later the Bahraini royal family moved to Bahrain to harvest pearls, only for the steward left behind to guard Qatar to proclaim himself king.
The occurrence of such a melodramatic farce reflected, to a certain extent, the poverty along the Persian Gulf coast from the nineteenth century to the early twentieth century.
This was also the main reason why East African government negotiators were dissatisfied with the terms offered by the British Government.
Freer said bluntly