The Second Moroccan Crisis could also be called the Agadir Crisis. Ernst was not particularly familiar with this stretch of history, but the fact that it had left an impression on him meant it was still rather important.
Over the following days, East Africa's intelligence network in Europe continually sent information back to the East African mainland regarding German and French movements amid this crisis.
"National sentiment is running high in German and French public opinion. Both sides' forces show signs of gathering at the front lines. Germany and France may go to war!"
This was the news sent back on the second day after the Agadir Crisis erupted. It gave the East African government, and Ernst in particular, quite a headache. Deep down, Ernst did not want Europe to start fighting at this time.
At the current stage, East Africa was not yet prepared to deal with a European War. In fact, beginning with the Second Five-Year Plan, Ernst had already started preparing for the outbreak of a European War and adjusted certain targets for the development of the defense industry and light industry.
However, the Third Five-Year Plan was the true beginning of Ernst's large-scale transformation of mainland industrial development in preparation for a European War.
In the East African government's plans, if a major war broke out in Europe within the next few years, mainland industry would adapt to wartime conditions in Europe and undertake large-scale production to meet orders from European countries, while rapidly expanding into world markets beyond Europe.
But the Third Five-Year Plan had only just begun, and many East African enterprises had not yet completed their transformation. If a full-scale war erupted in Europe now, the benefits East Africa ultimately gained would be greatly diminished.
Thus, for Europe's "peace and stability," Ernst issued