The East African National Defense Army had already become a formidable regional force capable of deterrence, sufficient to meet East Africa's homeland defense needs. Overseas territories were another matter. East Africa had quite a few overseas territories, including the newly acquired Northern Bay Territory, which Ernst valued most highly and where considerable forces were stationed, followed by Alaska.
However, apart from the Northern Bay Territory, the garrisons in the other overseas territories could basically be ignored. If other countries truly decided to make trouble for East Africa's overseas lands, most of them would not hold out until East African support arrived.
Alaska, for instance, was simply too far from East Africa. If the surrounding countries were determined to strike at Alaska, East Africa could only choose to abandon it.
Thus, the troops stationed in overseas territories other than the Northern Bay Territory generally served a symbolic purpose and were not numerous. Their security depended entirely on the deterrent power of the East African mainland.
The main issue was that most overseas territories were poorly situated, all lying east of the Strait of Malacca, while the Strait of Malacca itself was not under East African control. This left East Africa's whip too long to reach the horse.
The Northern Bay Territory was different. On one hand, East Africa had relocated a considerable population there and stationed troops there; on the other, the Northern Bay Territory lay within the East African Navy's operational reach. Traveling from Mogadishu to the Persian Gulf was still quite convenient.
Although Britain likewise controlled the Persian Gulf's outlet to the sea, the Indian Ocean was, after all, the East African Navy's home ground. Therefore, the East African Navy was confident it could break through a blockade of the Persian Gulf.
Including the garrisons in the East African