Trade with East Africa and the United States was now the lifeline of Russian industry and commerce. Trade with East Africa in particular sustained the stability of Russian society.
For example, the vast quantities of grain and supplies needed by the Russian Army at the front had to be provided by East Africa. Although Russia's grain output should theoretically have been enough for self-sufficiency, its terrible transportation and bloated, corrupt logistics system meant that grain from the rear simply could not reach the front, nor meet the needs of the frontline army and the western industrial centers.
As a result, Russian troops at the front were even eating East African wheat bread. For Russia, a major grain-producing nation, this was simply unimaginable. Before the war, Russia had produced nearly one-fifth of the world's wheat.
Prices for industrial goods within Russia had risen madly with the coming of war. Boots, for instance, had gone up by more than 200 percent, while matches had risen by more than 300 percent. It was now winter, and both were indispensable basic necessities. This was already the result after large quantities of East African goods had flowed in.
Industry and agriculture were alike in this regard, while Russia's woeful military-industrial capacity was displayed to the fullest on the battlefield. Although Russia had mobilized vast numbers of troops, at least a quarter of the Russian Army had not been issued rifles.
From ordinary ammunition to telephone wire, there was scarcely anything that was not in short supply. Heavy weapons had been few to begin with, and every one destroyed meant one fewer remaining. There had even been times when Russian troops at the front had fewer than three artillery shells available to fire per day.
This meant that East Africa's exports to Russia consisted largely of