On the third day alone, Keppel personally visited Freer's temporary residence.
"Lord Freer, by agreeing to this territorial transaction with your country, we have practically sold these dozen-odd islands for a song. We only hope that your country will safeguard our interests in the Nanyang region in the future."
"Easily said, easily said. I dare assure Your Excellency the Prime Minister that we East Africans have no designs on the East Indies. Our request for your country's assistance this time stems entirely from the strategic security needs of the Nanyang region."
Having concluded the deal, Freer was in high spirits and naturally no longer made things difficult for Keppel. On one hand, he soothed the Dutch prime minister; on the other, he greatly admired the Dutch government's pragmatic attitude of recognizing the times and submitting to necessity.
As for Prime Minister Keppel's claim that they had "sold cheaply," that was indeed true. Islands with such strategic importance were not something any country could buy simply because it wanted to, much less when East Africa had paid so little.
It was only because the British were bogged down in the mire of the First World War that they had not stepped out to prevent this territorial transaction between East Africa and the Netherlands.
In fact, East Africa's earlier forcible seizure of the Kra Isthmus Territory already showed Britain's current inability to cope in the Nanyang region.
In the past, let alone allowing East Africa to control a strategic point like the Isthmus of Kra, Britain would not even have tolerated the potential threat East Africa posed to British colonies on the Malay Peninsula, or East Africa's extension of its influence into the East Indian Ocean and the resulting potential pressure on India.
The British would never have allowed East Africa to