February 14, 1917.
Port of Basra.
Since the Baghdad Railway had been fully connected, this place had become the main artery of trade between East Africa and the Central Powers.
At Port of Basra, as the railway had extended here, the port had undergone a new round of renovations. Yet even the renovated Port of Basra clearly could not meet the Baghdad Railway's current bustling demands.
Large cranes and loading bridges continuously moved cargo off the ships, while tens of thousands of dockworkers gathered here to unload bulk goods.
Some important supplies were loaded onto trains the moment they came off the ships, then carried directly north along the railway lines. Port of Basra also gathered a large number of automobiles and vessels to share the burden of the Baghdad Railway.
Even so, vast quantities of cargo could only be temporarily stored in Basra's warehouses, including but not limited to grain, cotton, arms, and other war materiel.
To safeguard this lifeline, the Ottoman Empire navy and the East African Navy constantly patrolled the Persian Gulf region.
The Ottoman Empire navy's main task was to prevent British sneak attacks on Basra's port, while the East African Navy naturally operated nearby under the pretext of escorting its own merchant vessels.
The British Navy in the Persian Gulf could only rage in helpless fury, just as East Africa did when facing the English Channel and the Suez Canal.
The British Navy in the Persian Gulf, or its colonies, clearly did not possess the formidable strength of the home fleet. Provoking the East African Indian Ocean Fleet in the Indian Ocean was like challenging a tiger in its own mountain.
No one knew when it had begun, but an enormous complex had risen from the ground at Port of Basra. It looked neither like