Supporting Chile's legitimate interests did not mean supporting Chile's interests outright. After all, Chile still could not be considered "one of their own" in the eyes of the East African government.
This was important, because Chile had conflicts with nearly all its neighbors. Peru and Bolivia had once fought bitterly with Chile, and Chile had also had territorial disputes with Argentina.
Unless Chile was willing to become East Africa's political and military ally, East Africa would certainly not explicitly stand behind the Chilean government.
Indeed, if the Chilean government failed to recognize the times, the East African government would certainly not mind supporting Chile's enemies and triggering a new round of regional conflict.
Of course, judging by the current relationship between East Africa and Chile, the odds of that happening were extremely slim—unless the next Chilean government became a puppet wholly backed by the United States and turned its foreign policy around by one hundred and eighty degrees.
And if that truly happened, it could only mean that the East African government was incompetent. After all, the United States could support its own puppets, and East Africa could do the same. In the overall competitive environment, East Africa even held the advantage.
The conversation between Reni and Karikal, to a certain extent, represented the thinking of the East African Central Government and the Chilean government. But there were no trivial matters in diplomacy, so they were relatively conservative and cautious.
Meanwhile, negotiations between the two countries' subordinate regional governments—Luanda City and Punta Arenas City—were far more proactive. For Luanda City and Punta Arenas City, their primary task was to drive their own economic development, leaving them with relatively fewer concerns.
Horn Grem, the mayor of Luanda City, was painting a rosy picture for Baldivia, the mayor of Punta Arenas