With the signing of the East Africa–Persia Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance, East Africa's Third Fleet sailed into Persia, preparing to build military bases along Persia's northwestern coast.
This further strengthened East Africa's military presence in the Persian Gulf region. Within the Gulf itself, at its exits, and along its periphery, East Africa had achieved a staggered competition with Britain.
Britain's military footholds in the Persian Gulf, meanwhile, lay in Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, southern Persia, and several important islands. Without considering external support, East Africa and Britain had effectively divided the Persian Gulf between themselves.
But in truth, East Africa's competition with other countries in the Persian Gulf naturally had to take other factors into account. Mainland Britain was far from the Persian Gulf; although it had India as a logistical foothold, it clearly could not compare to East Africa's powerful industrial base at home.
According to the intelligence currently available to East Africa, Britain was now pouring its main efforts into Egypt, British Somaliland, Yemen, and other regions along the Red Sea coast.
The outcome of the First World War had already proved that Britain's global strategic deployment could not afford to turn a blind eye to East Africa, this newly risen world power.
Yet at this time, Britain no longer had the strength to suppress East Africa's rise in the Indian Ocean and South Atlantic. Britain's strategy toward East Africa had therefore shifted toward defense.
The focus of Britain's defensive strategy was to prevent East Africa from infiltrating Europe as much as possible. As a result, Egypt and the Suez Canal became the crown jewels of this strategy.
As for the Indian Ocean, Britain had completely shifted to defense. Its current attitude toward that direction was to preserve, as far as possible, the security of strategic locations