To East Africa, Paraguay, Bolivia, and Uruguay played the same role that Japan and South Korea had played for the United States in a previous life: easy to control, while also serving to check Argentina and Brazil.
Bolivia and Paraguay allowed East Africa to monitor and manipulate the local situation deep in inland South America. Their strategic significance was equivalent to the U.S. military occupying Afghanistan in a previous life and thereby threatening the heartlands of the Far East Empire and Russia—though, of course, the United States had ultimately failed to achieve that.
Uruguay, meanwhile, ensured the East African Navy's presence along South America's East Coast. Together with Venezuela, one in the south and one in the north, they watched over the entire East Coast of South America.
These military deployments had essentially established East Africa's strategic advantage across South America, further consolidating East African military hegemony throughout the South Atlantic.
If conditions allowed, East Africa actually wanted to take the opportunity to improve the Paraná River basin as well, particularly the stretch between Suárez Port and Corumbá Port. But at this point in time, that was clearly impossible.
First, the Paraná River was not an East African river, and East Africa could not possibly pay out of its own pocket to help South Americans dredge it. Second, due to the economic crisis, South American Countries had no money to hire East Africa for such engineering projects. Finally, there were conflicts of interest.
Paraguay, Bolivia, and Uruguay were relatively easy to deal with, but Argentina and Brazil had little interest in improving the Paraná River. As a result, the various countries held differing attitudes toward its development.
East African water conservancy expert Moka stood by Suárez Port and said, "The Paraná River's shipping potential surpasses that of all our