Of course, in the early twentieth century, the international community's outlook remained relatively barbaric and primitive. For the countries of the world at present, per capita figures were not data worth valuing. Strength was strength—the ability to stand higher than others.
Compared with improving people's livelihoods, plundering abroad through force produced results more quickly. The relatively higher moral standards of the international community in the twenty-first century of Ernst's previous life were, to some extent, the result of a balance of military power.
From the modern era until before the nineteenth century, the Western world had relied on technological and industrial advantages to lead the entire world in military affairs, and could therefore do whatever it pleased.
However, as the world market took shape, technology would also spread to other regions of the world. This spread was not something Western countries undertook voluntarily, but an inevitable choice in building the world market and expanding their own trade advantages.
Take East Africa's exports of industrial equipment to the Soviet Union. Objectively, they advanced Soviet industry and accelerated Soviet industrialization, but East Africa was absolutely not kindly helping the Soviet Union build its industry.
That was still true for a great power like the Soviet Union. As for those weak and small countries, they were even more like ducks driven onto a perch, forced to become blood-transfusion tubes for powerful nations' economies.
In other words, in the eyes of great powers like East Africa, these countries were in fact "slaves." Yet even slaves had to be given a mouthful of food by their masters. Otherwise, how could they work for their masters and create more wealth? If the slaves themselves forgot all past grievances over that mouthful of food and became deeply grateful, then the fate of such slave nations was not