Across the entire African continent, only Northwest Africa lay beyond East Africa's easy reach by land. First, it was too far from East Africa; second, the terrain in between was too harsh and transportation extremely backward; finally, Northwest Africa had the backing of European countries.
Northeast Africa was clearly different. Take Egypt, for instance: East Africa could follow the Nile River or pass through Darfur to enter Egypt.
Although Egypt likewise had British support behind it, Britain itself was far from Egypt. Being able to control Egypt through the seas and cow those European countries that also coveted Egypt was already the limit of what it could do. If the enemy came from inland—and from East Africa—Britain could do nothing but stare helplessly.
As for other parts of Northeast Africa, once the North African Railway opened, they would likewise find it difficult to withstand East Africa's landward spearhead.
Clearly, Italy, which had cooperated with East Africa in developing the North African Railway, understood this as well. But why would Italy risk "inviting the wolf into the house" by cooperating with East Africa?
In the final analysis, Italy simply had too few choices and lacked sufficient understanding of Libya.
Why had Italy made Libya its colony? Fundamentally, Italy had unified too late, lacked strength, and entered the colonial scramble too late. If possible, Benito would clearly have preferred Tunisia, Algeria, or French Libya as Italy's colonies.
As for Italian Libya, even if developed to the utmost, it could support at most one or two million people. For an Italy with a population of over forty million, that was merely a drop in the bucket.
At the same time, Libya's petroleum resources had yet to be thoroughly explored, so Italy was sitting atop a treasure mountain without knowing it.
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