The military and strategic significance of the Sunda Strait far outweighed its economic value. Another consideration behind East Africa's strengthened military deployment there was to prevent Japan, after invading the Nanyang region in the future, from severing the connection between East Africa and its Pacific colonies and fleets.
In the previous life, Japan had effectively completed its blockade of the western side of the Nanyang region. The Sunda Strait was occupied by the Japanese army, and the Strait of Malacca also fell into Japanese hands for a time.
However, Japan's main enemy at sea at the time was the United States. Therefore, even if Japan had blocked the maritime routes between the European colonizers and Nanyang, it still could not reverse the deterioration of its overall strategic position.
East Africa could not tolerate the Sunda Strait falling into Japanese hands. If that happened, it was not because East Africa feared Japan could truly use those two straits to seal East Africa within the Indian Ocean.
Rather, it might cause East Africa to lose the initiative in its contest with the United States for future dominance over the Pacific Ocean. One step behind meant falling behind at every step, so the Sunda Strait was the bottom line of East Africa's strategic deployment in Nanyang.
Colonel Hyde said, "The Empire has made two layers of deployments in the Sunda Strait. This ensures that even if the Sunda Strait falls into enemy hands due to a surprise attack, we can use the second line of defense as our core and reclaim control of the Sunda Strait from both land and sea."
The first of the two defensive lines in the Sunda Strait was the fortress on Kittibang's southern shore and the gun battery on Sangiang Island in the middle of the strait. Relying