The French government's choice was rational, and East Africa was no less so. Lieutenant Masers reported the news to his superiors, and since East Africa was already close to Madagascar Island, the East African government learned of the border friction between the two countries before the French government did.
"We had foreseen this day long ago. After all, the Madagascar Island issue had laid its foreshadowing as early as the last century. It was simply that no one had imagined that East Africa and France would ultimately have disagreements in this region," said East African Foreign Minister Hermann.
That was nonsense. East Africa had only stepped onto the stage of history in the mid-to-late nineteenth century, while France had begun colonial activities on Madagascar Island as early as the end of the eighteenth century. Originally, there had been no role for East Africa at all. Yet East Africa's sudden emergence had disrupted the original Anglo-French contest, and Britain now attached even less importance to Madagascar Island than it had in the previous life.
This was easy enough to understand. The South African War had effectively replaced the Boer War of the previous life, marking the first shoots of decline in Britain's global hegemony. Britain therefore had no desire to go through such a thing on Madagascar Island again at this time.
Of course, France had never fought East Africa before, so East Africa itself could not be certain of the outcome. That did not mean East Africa lacked confidence in defeating France on its own soil. In East Africa's eyes, its territory on Madagascar Island was also part of the homeland.
"If we can negotiate, then negotiate. If we cannot, then fight. There is no fundamental conflict of interest between us and France, so we should begin with negotiations in