The East African Army and the Matabele Kingdom's forces clashed east of Bulawayo. East Africa's side consisted of the South Salzburg Province border troops and part of the Southern Army's Second Brigade, totaling over six thousand men. The Matabele Kingdom fielded more than sixteen thousand troops, including over ten thousand Shona auxiliary soldiers.
Svit raised his binoculars and looked toward the Matabele Kingdom's positions. "Looks like the Matabele Kingdom intends to fight with its back to the river. But they actually chose to face us head-on. Now that's interesting!"
The tactic that gave the East African Army the greatest headache when dealing with natives was guerrilla warfare. Thus, the East African Army had accumulated extensive counter-guerrilla experience in Africa. But the Kingdom of East Africa naturally preferred its enemies in East Africa to fight openly and honorably rather than lurking in the shadows to stab them in the back.
The Ndebele people's reason for choosing a frontal battle was straightforward: they knew very little about using firearms, especially commanding firearm troops on such a large scale. They could only rely on Boer instructors to handle it.
What large-scale command experience did the Boers have? They themselves favored guerrilla tactics, made even more nimble by cavalry support.
Without relevant experience, they simply copied what already existed. The Boer instructors directly borrowed the British Lobsterbacks' "line-up-and-shoot-to-kill tactics" and applied them to the Ndebele people.
The British still had some prestige, after all. They were the World's Number One Power, and the British Lobsterbacks had been without a single worthy opponent in the colonies using their "line-up-and-shoot-to-kill tactics."
The formal name for line-up-and-shoot-to-kill tactics was linear tactics. The emergence of linear tactics had been a helpless necessity imposed by the limitations of firearms at the time, primarily to ensure lethality. To maximize the