Chapter Summaries

Ernst ordered East Africa’s National Canal Plan completed by the end of 1915, making it the Third Five-Year Plan’s foremost engineering project. The plan aimed to link the country’s major rivers and lakes, cut transport costs, and exploit Black laborers before they were expelled by 1920.

• Ernst told government officials that East Africa’s industrial capacity and infrastructure made the National Canal Plan easier to build than the East African Grand Canal.
• Ernst said the project would use at least three million Black laborers and required every department to work with the Ministry of Water Conservancy to finish by 1915.
• Ernst declared that East Africa would clear out its Black laborers before 1920, once their labor no longer had value to exploit.
• Yalstede explained that the plan would connect the Nile, Congo, and Zambezi river systems with the Great Lake, Lake Tanganyika, and Lake Malawi, creating a waterway network across roughly forty percent of the country.
• Yalstede said the canals would lower freight costs and support inland development, while remaining a supplement to railways because East African rivers were difficult to navigate.

East Africa’s National Canal Plan aimed to lower transport costs as its industry grew, while Britain viewed East Africa’s expanding influence and industrial strength as a rising threat. The chapter ended with British leaders admitting that East Africa was far harder to contain than the United States.

• East Africa continued its National Canal Plan, which would bring its artificial waterways to a total of five thousand kilometers and support shipping and energy security.
• Britain grew concerned after East Africa’s Navy visited South America, where Britain held extensive economic interests.
• Asquith and George described East Africa, Germany, and the United States as emerging industrial powers challenging Britain’s position.
• Asquith argued that Britain could influence the United States but struggled to penetrate East Africa’s closed economy or restrain its development.
• British leaders recognized East Africa’s dreadnought fleet as evidence of a shipbuilding industry approaching Britain’s strength.

British leaders feared that East Africa’s growing navy could threaten imperial influence in the Indian Ocean and South Atlantic, so they considered how to restrain it while Europe remained tense. After hearing Cromwell’s assessment of East Africa’s strength, Asquith decided Britain would approach its government and seek concessions before resorting to harsher measures.

• George warned that East Africa’s four dreadnoughts and expanding influence threatened British interests in the Indian Ocean and South Atlantic.
• Asquith agreed that Britain needed to focus on Europe but asked how it could persuade the United States and East Africa to limit their navies.
• George proposed consulting former British Ambassador Cromwell, who described East Africa’s industrial growth, cities, and ports to Asquith and George.
• Cromwell estimated that East Africa had been stronger than the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1906 and might now be comparable to France, though below Russia in total economic output.
• Asquith decided Britain would contact the East African government to test its limits and offer concessions, with extreme measures as a fallback.

Ernst rejected Britain’s objections to East Africa’s activities in the Persian Gulf and South America, insisting that they served East African interests. After Russell threatened over East Africa’s naval expansion, Ernst stood firm, and the British ambassador shifted toward negotiating a compromise.

• Russell met with Ernst to discuss East African activities and regional stability, while Ernst argued that East Africa needed overseas trade and influence for its development.
• Russell accused East Africa of harming British interests in the Persian Gulf and South America, but Ernst maintained that East Africa’s actions were legal and served its own interests.
• Russell warned that East Africa’s naval expansion threatened the regional balance and that Britain would respond if East Africa crossed its red line.
• Ernst declared that East Africa feared no nation and invoked its population and victory in the South African War as reasons Britain could not threaten it.
• Russell backed away from confrontation and proposed mutual concessions and negotiations, especially regarding East Africa’s naval development.

Ernst used Britain's desire to limit East Africa's naval expansion to negotiate for market access and strategic footholds around the Indian Ocean. Russell offered major concessions concerning the Persian Gulf and South America, and the chapter ended with both sides agreeing to work out the details through further negotiations.

• The chapter described East Africa's naval strength and Britain's fear that its growing fleet could threaten British control of the Indian Ocean.
• Ernst told Russell that East Africa would not halt its naval race, though he implied its future scale could remain negotiable.
• Russell offered concessions on the Persian Gulf and South America if East Africa kept its navy within a low-risk range.
• Ernst asked Britain to provide fairer international market competition and support East Africa's acquisition of strategic overseas footholds.
• Ernst proposed that the two governments negotiate the specific terms, and Russell's concessions gave him the leverage he sought.

Ernst and East African officials discussed Britain’s proposal to limit East Africa’s naval expansion in exchange for other interests. They rejected a fixed restriction and left the negotiations with France’s navy as the minimum benchmark for East African naval strength.

• Ernst and British Ambassador Russell ended their meeting, with Russell returning to report to London and Ernst convening East African officials.
• Svit argued that Britain wanted to restrict East Africa’s navy because of pressure at sea, and that East Africa could not accept limits that would leave it behind other powers.
• Ernst said East Africa could use flexibility in the size of its navy as a bargaining chip while still pursuing a force capable of deterring other countries.
• Merke proposed that East Africa’s navy reach at least France’s level of more than eight hundred thousand tons, while Commander-in-Chief Bruce argued for a target exceeding one million tons.
• Svit concluded that East Africa should use the French Navy as its reference point and treat its strength as the minimum standard for national naval development.

Ernst and Svit led a discussion on East Africa’s naval ambitions and its upcoming negotiations with Britain. They agreed to seek a thaw in relations and wider economic cooperation while maintaining East Africa’s goal of building a second-tier navy.

• Svit argued that East Africa needed to bring its navy up to the second tier, using France as a benchmark for the negotiations with Britain.
• Ernst set second-tier naval strength as East Africa’s bottom line and invited proposals for benefits to seek from Britain.
• Svit called for access to South American markets and better trade with British spheres such as India and Australia.
• Ernst supported easing tensions and attracting British investment, saying closer economic ties could benefit East Africa.
• The government agreed to pursue improved relations, economic cooperation, and access to more markets.

Ernst and East African officials discussed seeking an Indian Ocean foothold from Britain, while weighing why Britain would never surrender control of the Red Sea shipping lanes. The chapter left East Africa wary of joining a European war because its routes were controlled by Britain and victory was far from assured.

• Ernst said East Africa should seek an overseas foothold in the Indian Ocean through negotiations with Britain, even at a significant cost.
• Svit outlined Britain's Indian Ocean holdings and identified the Persian Gulf coast as the only plausible area for East Africa to pursue.
• East African officials recognized that Britain would not relinquish the Red Sea shipping lanes, whose chokepoints kept East Africa from bypassing Britain to trade with Europe.
• The chapter explained that control of the Red Sea could connect German states and strengthen their war potential, making Britain, France, and other powers determined to prevent it.
• East Africa's government judged that joining a European war carried grave risks because Britain controlled the sea routes and Germany might lose, leaving East Africa exposed to its enemies.

Ernst and East African officials planned to secure a large stretch of Persian Gulf coastline from Britain, accepting desert land as long as the territory was extensive enough. They intended to use impossible demands elsewhere to steer negotiations toward the Persian Gulf, where Britain might be willing to concede ground.

• Svit judged that Britain would not allow East Africa to approach the Red Sea or other vital British routes, leaving the Persian Gulf coast as the likeliest area for negotiation.
• Ernst explained that Britain might surrender strategically less critical territory as it struggled to preserve its declining global power.
• Ernst told East African officials that they should seek a large area with coastline along the Persian Gulf, even if Britain offered only desert.
• Ernst explained that Persian Gulf territory could secure East Africa a future source of oil as domestic consumption rose and local production struggled to keep pace.
• East African officials agreed to begin negotiations with demands for areas Britain would reject, expecting Britain to steer the eventual discussion toward the Persian Gulf.

Russell and Robinson described East Africa’s expanding communications system and its rapidly growing submarine cable network, which had become the world’s second largest after Britain’s. East Africa aimed to complete links to the Americas and safeguard its access to global information from British interference.

• Russell used East Africa’s communications network to explain the government’s position to London, then praised the country’s communications reach with Robinson.
• East Africa expanded domestic telegraph and telephone lines and built overseas submarine cables linking its coasts with Europe, the Far East Empire, and other regions.
• East Africa began constructing a submarine cable to South America and planned routes to North America, extending its network toward a global system centered on East Africa.
• The British Government’s control of submarine cables had historically enabled it to monitor and influence communications, including during the First World War of Ernst’s previous life.
• Ernst’s government pursued an independent global communications network to protect East Africa’s security and shape foreign perceptions through propaganda.

British Prime Minister Asquith and Finance Minister George debated East Africa’s demands for market access and territory, weighing them against Britain’s limited ability to confront East Africa while Europe remained unstable. Asquith chose to make temporary concessions, provided East Africa restrained its navy, and Britain began considering which markets and Indian Ocean territory it could yield.

• Asquith presented Ambassador Russell’s report and called East Africa’s demands greedy.
• George argued that opposing East Africa would risk mutual destruction and that Britain could not prevent East Africa from expanding through other means.
• Asquith decided Britain would accept East Africa’s reasonable demands for now, conditional on limits to the East African Navy.
• George supported temporary concessions, noting that Britain could divide markets to protect its industrial strengths and avoid competing directly with East Africa.
• Asquith ordered the government to plan which markets and Indian Ocean territory Britain could yield without harming its core interests.

Asquith approved a draft for domestic proposals and sent George to negotiate with East Africa in East Africa. In Rhine City, East Africa and Britain clashed over naval tonnage limits, with neither side yielding on the scale East Africa needed to protect its interests.

• Asquith approved the domestic proposal and ordered George to send it to the Embassy to East Africa for negotiations.
• Freer rejected Britain's proposed naval limit of five hundred thousand tons, arguing that it would leave East Africa behind Japan.
• Russell defended Japan's strength and argued that Britain's proposed naval allocation was enough to support East Africa's status as a great power.
• Freer demanded a minimum of one million tons so East Africa could counterbalance every navy except the Royal Navy.
• Russell rejected the demand, warning that it would undermine Britain's two-power naval standard as other major navies grew.

British ambassador Russell tried to persuade East Africa to reduce its naval expansion by offering diplomatic and economic concessions, then proposed ceding Dubai in the Persian Gulf. Freer dismissed Dubai as nearly worthless, and Russell offered to negotiate over the entire Pirate Coast.

• Russell rejected Freer's demand for a million-ton East African navy and promised British protection in the Indian Ocean and South Atlantic.
• Freer said East Africa would consider Britain's offer before revealing its position on naval tonnage.
• Russell offered to restore diplomatic relations, end Britain's economic sanctions, and open markets to East Africa, but the East African officials showed little interest.
• Russell proposed transferring Dubai to East Africa as a foothold in the Persian Gulf.
• Freer mocked the barren territory and said East Africa might reduce its navy by only a few hundred tons in response.
• Russell offered to discuss ceding the entire Pirate Coast if East Africa proposed terms Britain found acceptable.

Freer and Russell negotiated over Britain’s proposal to transfer the Pirate Coast to East Africa, with Freer arguing that the barren territory was worth little and demanding a much larger concession. The discussion ended with Freer drawing a circle around the entire Pirate Coast, though East African officials still regarded it as an unprofitable acquisition.

• Freer told Russell that the Pirate Coast had little economic value and that Britain’s proposed territory was too small.
• Russell argued that East Africa could gain political influence in the Persian Gulf by acquiring the region.
• Freer stressed the Pirate Coast’s poverty, scarce water, tiny population, and reliance on pearl trading, while identifying Al Ain Oasis as its main valuable area.
• Freer demanded that Britain expand the proposed territory to cover the entire Pirate Coast.
• Freer drew a circle around the whole Pirate Coast under Russell’s watch, despite the territory’s low value in the eyes of East African officials.

East Africa and Britain negotiated naval limits in exchange for political and economic reconciliation and British overseas concessions. In March 1911, they signed the East African-British Reconciliation Treaty, which secured the Pirate Coast for East Africa while placing temporary limits on its navy.

• Russell offered the Pirate Coast to East Africa, provided its navy stayed within limits Britain considered reasonable.
• Freer rejected Britain’s initial naval terms, and Russell proposed limiting East African tonnage to 650,000 tons.
• Freer argued that the limit would become inadequate as other navies expanded, so Russell proposed tying East African naval strength to 80 percent of the French Navy.
• Freer demanded a five-year limit and protections against the Imperial Japanese Navy surpassing East Africa, and the two sides continued bargaining.
• After two months of negotiations, Britain and East Africa signed the treaty in March 1911, agreeing to political reconciliation, economic cooperation, the transfer of the Pirate Coast, and temporary naval limits.

Ernst renamed the former Pirate Coast the Northern Bay Territory and planned to establish direct military rule while avoiding actions that could provoke the wider Arab world. After tribal resistance and outside aid complicated East Africa’s takeover, its forces conquered the territory and expelled its inhabitants, leaving East Africa poised to intervene in Middle Eastern politics.

• Ernst named the former Pirate Coast the Northern Bay Territory, placed it under direct military administration, and designated Al Ain Oasis as New Rhine Oasis and the territory’s political and military center.
• Local tribes seized power after the British withdrew, and East Africa sent naval support and more than three thousand troops from the Northeastern Military Region to conquer the territory.
• East Africa used former Zanzibari collaborators for intelligence and spent nearly half a year fighting tribal forces aided by neighboring Arab powers.
• After taking control of the main settlements and water sources, East Africa pressured surrounding states and expelled several tens of thousands of residents, most of whom fled to the Ottoman Empire or Oman.
• East Africa ended the campaign with more than three hundred casualties and retaliated against the Arab forces that had aided the resistance, beginning its military and political intervention in the Middle East.

East Africa consolidated its conquest of the Northern Bay Territory through migration while Ernst judged the campaign acceptable despite the army’s shortcomings. At home, the Third Five-Year Plan prioritized light industry and began cautiously loosening economic controls to address consumer needs and expose established industries to competition.

• East Africa replaced residents and secured water sources in the Northern Bay Territory, driving out or killing the original population and stabilizing its rule.
• Britain took East Africa’s poor military performance as reassurance that its Gulf colonies faced little danger, while Ernst accepted the campaign’s results and expected the army to review its failures.
• East Africa launched the Third Five-Year Plan with light industry as a national priority, recognizing that its limited product variety could not meet diverse consumer needs or compete abroad.
• East African policymakers planned to ease economic controls gradually and let market forces help develop varied consumer goods and connect the economy with foreign investment.
• The plan called for limited competition in stronger industrial sectors to encourage reform, while light industry would continue receiving support until it became more developed.

After the East Africa–Britain Reconciliation Treaty forced East Africa to reduce its naval construction plans, Ernst proposed redirecting the freed funds and workers into civilian shipbuilding, shipbuilding technology, and aircraft-carrier development. The chapter ended with East Africa preparing to use the treaty’s limits as an opportunity to strengthen its shipbuilding industry and plan its first aircraft carrier.

• Ernst said the treaty had cut military ship orders and called for policies to limit the damage to East African shipbuilding.
• Klee Shawn reported that military orders had fallen from at least eighteen percent of annual ship orders to about ten percent, while East Africa’s naval tonnage target had been reduced from 800,000 to 650,000 tons.
• Ernst argued that East Africa could extend construction schedules and redirect unused naval funds and personnel to civilian vessels and specialized ship research.
• Ernst explained that East Africa’s naval ambitions had partly been a bluff in negotiations and that the treaty allowed the government to shift resources from an arms race toward economic and technological development.
• Ernst called for accelerating aircraft-carrier development and completing a plan for East Africa’s first carrier before the Third Five-Year Plan began.
• Ernst urged East Africa to use Britain’s attention elsewhere to improve its shipbuilding system, lower costs, and expand civilian shipbuilding.

Ernst and Klee Shawn discussed East Africa’s civilian shipbuilding prospects, industrial links, and plans to expand steel production while advancing naval technology selectively. The chapter left East Africa aiming to use its industrial growth and the naval arms race’s distractions to develop civilian shipbuilding without being drawn into excessive military competition.

• Ernst said East Africa needed more civilian ships, especially oil carriers, to support its growing petroleum demand and energy security.
• Klee Shawn reported that shipyards were adopting new technologies and materials and making progress in marine engines, dry docks, and slipways.
• East Africa set a Third Five-Year Plan goal of producing at least twenty million tons of steel before 1915 and surpassing Germany as the world’s second-largest producer.
• Ernst called for East Africa to pursue leapfrog growth in civilian shipbuilding while concentrating military shipbuilding on aircraft carriers, submarines, and quality improvements.
• Ernst said East Africa should focus on economic development rather than intensifying the naval arms race.

The Mostar Hydroelectric Power Station, built with East African assistance, opened in Bosnia on April 7, 1911. Its completion highlighted East Africa’s growing influence in the Neretva River valley, while its broader effort to control Bosnia’s economy remained limited by the region’s difficult terrain and complex ethnic and political rivalries.

• Kerlev celebrated the opening of the Mostar Hydroelectric Power Station and said it would support the city’s electricity supply and industrial development.
• The chapter described how the Hohenzollern Conglomerate had developed the Neretva River valley through farms, plantations, and immigration, leaving Chinese residents as most of the local population.
• East Africa had used the Port of Ploče and Mostar to establish a presence along the key route between Bosnia’s interior and the Adriatic coast.
• East Africa’s plans to control Bosnia’s economy had struggled because the mountainous terrain complicated transport and Sarajevo was contested by rival ethnic, religious, and imperial powers.