Van der Sar was in goal. From left to right, the back line was Evra, Vidić, Ferdinand, and Fabio. The midfield consisted of Park Ji-sung, Giggs, Carrick, and Valencia, while Rooney and Erl led the attack.
For this FA Cup final, Ferguson had fielded his ideal starting eleven.
But surprisingly, he had not adopted his usual 4-3-3 formation. Instead, he had gone with a 4-4-2.
The players' exact positioning would only become clear during the match, but Ferguson had obviously adjusted his usual tactics.
When Guardiola saw this setup, he clearly let out a secret sigh of relief. His eyes were filled with approval as he looked toward Su Dong.
He had guessed right!
Ferguson's decision to use a 4-4-2 was actually meant to facilitate solid defense and counterattacks.
Man City's overall strength was in no way inferior to Manchester United's—in fact, it was slightly superior. Combined with the team's tactical advantage, Man City would basically take the initiative and suppress its opponent. Ferguson's 4-4-2, meanwhile, was a deliberate show of weakness, pulling back to defend.
But if anyone thought Manchester United would simply play that way, they were wrong.
What Ferguson wanted was counter-suppression.
But there was one problem: if he wanted to counter-suppress Man City, why had he chosen Erl?
"We were all wrong. He didn't use a five-man midfield." Estiarte shook his head.
The Man City coaching staff had expected Ferguson to use Fletcher instead of Erl.
That way, Manchester United would have a five-man midfield. During counterattacks, Valencia and Park Ji-sung would push up from both wings to find Rooney.
Manchester United had used this approach before, so they were practically second nature to it.
But Ferguson hadn't done that. He had taken Fletcher off and brought Erl on.
"He still wants to suppress our defense