In the Name of Peace

As time entered August 1924, Britain and Australasia had completed their preparations for war in Central America.

After careful consideration, the two countries decided to carry out their plan and pressure the United States through the war in Central America.

The war in Central America had already lasted for more than a year, and the United States had no particularly effective way to deal with the resistance of the Central American countries.

Moreover, with Britain and Australasia providing an endless stream of support, the Central American countries still held considerable advantages in this kind of guerrilla war.

El Salvador, in particular, where the United States had stationed very few troops, had basically driven the United States Army out and was teeming with Australasia's intelligence agents.

Nicaragua, which had first launched the movement to resist American military bases, faced the United States Army's top-priority counterattack.

But both sides fought cautiously in Nicaragua, maintaining the conflict at the scale of guerrilla warfare and never allowing it to escalate into all-out combat.

This was actually the wisest choice for both sides. After all, Nicaragua's opposition did not want to see a full-scale war break out with the United States, while the United States did not want to make the war official and engage in a head-on confrontation with Britain, which stood behind Nicaragua.

Precisely because of this tacit understanding, the war in Central America was actually a large-scale guerrilla war rather than a true all-out war.

The opposition forces in several Central American countries merely wanted to drive the United States Army out of their countries. They were not arrogant enough to think they could completely defeat the United States.

Since the war had to end, negotiations with the United States were inevitable to determine the situation in Central America after the war.