At this moment, the Austrian Empire was enjoying boundless prestige on the diplomatic stage; its political influence on the European continent even surpassed Britain's.
After all, seemingly powerful Britain appeared to have no answer to the Austrian Empire, which had kept the British Navy out with an excuse so clumsy that even a layman could hear how far-fetched it was.
To ordinary people, this was proof of the Austrian Empire's strength, and this view was deeply influencing the smaller nations as well.
Britain had considered countermeasures. Naval Secretary Francis Baring proposed blockading the Mediterranean from the outside—using their own method to repay them in kind.
Yet the reality was that the Austrian Imperial Navy simply stayed in the Mediterranean and refused to come out. Moreover, Britain had no reasonable pretext; faced with the fully armed Austrian Imperial Navy right before them, not a single general was willing to take the risk.
If the soldiers were unwilling to gamble, the politicians were even less likely to approve it.
Britain's efforts were so difficult at this time because it had too many enemies and too few allies—the exact opposite of Britain's historical predicament. The British could neither draw in powerful allies nor break apart the hostile alliance.
When Britain had once weakened the Austrian Empire's influence, the latter had not only dared not resist, but had even cooperated with all its strength.
Until the very moment Britain sent troops to Crimea, Russia still regarded Britain as its loyal ally.
Even though Nicholas I and Foreign Minister Nesselrode knew perfectly well that Lord Redcliffe, the British ambassador, had incited the Ottoman Sultan to reject Russia's demands, even promising him that Britain would support the Ottoman Empire as it had in the past, they still believed the British would stand on their side.
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