In Moltke the Elder's eyes, Königgrätz was in fact a killing ground for the Austrian Army, because the conditions unfavorable to the Prussian Army would theoretically apply equally to the Austrians.
Moreover, reports from reconnaissance balloons corroborated intelligence coming from within the enemy ranks: the Austrians had formed an inverted V-shaped formation.
This formation was plainly an invitation to step into the urn, and combined with the advantageous terrain already occupied by the Austrian Army, it could easily withstand an assault from the front.
But Moltke the Elder could only say that the Austrians were still living in the eighteenth century. Their tactical thinking was far too antiquated—still the same old practice of massing troops into formation, as if they wished the soldiers would line up and exchange volleys again.
The Austrian Army's inverted V formation at Königgrätz currently appeared impregnable, but an attack from both flanks would instantly leave it unable to look after either head or tail.
As for the high ground at Hlum and Lipa, the advantage it could provide was also quite limited. A thrust through the center would immediately turn encirclement into a divided encirclement of the enemy.
War, when all was said and done, was still a contest between people. The Austrian Army's supreme commander in Bohemia was Count Latour. Moltke the Elder knew very well that this man craved grand achievements and was deeply obsessed with the philosophy of offense.
For him to suddenly break character and choose defense said a great deal. It meant that the Austrian Army's main force simply was not in Bohemia.
Otherwise, with Count Latour's temperament, he would have charged out long ago to settle matters in a decisive battle. He certainly would not have voluntarily abandoned the outer fortresses.
Of course, there was another possibility: Austria's backyard