Anything was easier said than done. Franz would not overlook the limitations of productivity. Railway construction techniques had gradually matured in this era, but construction efficiency was still not high.
Building 38,000 kilometers of railway in twenty years meant an average of 1,900 kilometers per year. In the mid-nineteenth century, that was undoubtedly a challenging undertaking.
Funding was also a problem. Twenty million shield to build 1,900 kilometers of railway meant an average budget of just over ten thousand shield per kilometer. With labor being basically free, that might barely suffice for construction in flatland areas. (Counting only construction costs, without considering relocation compensation or geological conditions.)
In reality, the Austrian Empire was not a country of plains. Complex terrain was far from uncommon, and this severely constrained railway construction as well.
These natural limitations could still be overcome. At worst, they could detour around them. After all, railway construction in Austria during this era could not possibly dig tunnels hundreds of meters long, much less several kilometers long.
When they encountered special terrain, whether they detoured or pressed ahead against the odds, it meant a dramatic increase in costs.
No one could answer how much it would ultimately cost. Perhaps once the field surveys were complete, the engineers would be able to provide a preliminary estimate.
The government's fiscal revenue was limited; it could not all be poured into railway construction. In Franz's view, annual railway construction expenses were best kept below five percent of fiscal revenue.
The shortfall could only be made up with private capital. Simply put, they had to find a way to make the nobles pay for railway construction.
This was Austria's particular national condition. Though the capitalist economy had already developed, most of society's wealth still remained in the hands of the nobility.
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