Zi Shou naturally knew the drawbacks of making camp with a river at his back.
Not only was it easy to get surrounded and trapped, but if the enemy encircled him, they were more likely to come downstream than attack from the front.
An attack by water was practically impossible to defend against. Although E Chongyu had died, his troops and officers had suffered no losses. E Shun's present difficulties only stemmed from his inability to bring them under unified command. Once he sorted that out, he would still be a powerful regional Feudal Lord. Moreover, E City lay in the south, and its soldiers and officers were all adept on the water.
Even without an encirclement or a surprise attack, a camp with a river at its back could still be flooded.
Zi Shou had deliberately chosen the worst possible terrain downstream to make camp. Forget ten thousand men-a few hundred sneaking upstream to block the waterway would suffice. Let the water build up for a while, then breach the dam, and the entire camp would be submerged.
This was quite possibly the stupidest choice of campsite imaginable, and there was a historical precedent for it, too.
The example once again involved Boss Cao. During Cao and Liu's struggle over Hanzhong, Xu Huang crossed the Han River and made camp with the river at his back. Huang Zhong and Zhao Yun then attacked him from two directions, routing his army and driving it into the Han River, with countless dead and wounded. Wang Ping, whose earnest attempts to dissuade Xu Huang had come to nothing, also abandoned Cao for Liu during this battle.
Xu Huang was one of Cao Wei's Five Elite Generals, and even he had lost. With Chao Lei, Fang Xiang, and Fang Bi, victory was surely