Li Ding's decision to march immediately was a dangerous move, because the autumn harvest was imminent.
Even the warlord with the least strategic vision-or, to put it bluntly, even the most shortsighted bandit-would be unable to resist wondering, when faced with fields of crops almost ready for reaping, whether he ought to harvest them before marching.
In Hebei, nearly four years of warfare had seen storms rise and clouds surge. Yet the only man who had dared march through fields of almost-ripe crops was Zhang Jincheng. Even then, Zhang Jincheng had been preparing to leave Qinghe, where the ravages of war had left insufficient crops in the fields, and head to Pingyuan to "find food."
Then Zhang Xing, Li Ding, and Cao Shancheng had struck him from front and rear and wiped him out.
So marching at this time posed a great many problems.
There was morale to consider. The troops of Wuan Commandery were manageable, but would Xiangguo Commandery's commandery troops and civilian laborers be willing to abandon their fields at home and go to war?
There was the march to consider. Li Ding and his military support team had previously conducted extensive reconnaissance and intelligence gathering in Xiangguo Commandery, but their knowledge of Zhao Commandery came only from routine, ordinary scouting. They also had to consider the damage that marching and fighting would do to the crops.
Beyond that, the most crucial point was that they had to seek a swift victory. Once the fighting dragged on and delayed the autumn harvest, it would trigger a whole chain of political, military, economic, and diplomatic problems. It might even recoil upon the newly annexed Xiangguo Commandery.
But-and that was the point-Li Ding still chose to march.
Because he knew the timing was impartial: his opponent faced much the same