The surrender of the Italian Army at this small position was like toppling the first domino. Over the next few short days, wherever the Anglo-French-Australasian forces appeared, Italian troops could immediately be seen raising white flags and announcing their surrender.
Even more bewildered than the Anglo-French-Australasian Army were the German forces still holding out in Bizerte and Tunis.
According to the German Army's original plan, the Italian Army to the south should have been able to hold out for at least two weeks. During those two weeks, the German Army could have relied on the terrain around Bizerte and Tunis to build a sturdy coastal defensive line.
But the fatal problem was that the Italian Army had not held out for two weeks—not even two days.
More importantly, with the surrender of the largest Italian force in the Tunisian region, the Anglo-French-Australasian forces had completely surrounded the entire Bizerte and Tunis region from land.
On January 5, 1938, the Italian Government received a telegram of questioning from the German Government, asking why the Italian Army had surrendered directly to the Anglo-French-Australasian forces without any advance notice.
Mussolini was utterly dumbfounded. He could hardly believe the German Government's accusation.
After all, the reports from the North African forces a few days earlier had clearly stated that they were putting up determined resistance against the Anglo-French-Australasian offensive.
If the German ambassador to Italy had not come looking for him as well, Mussolini might genuinely have thought that an enemy nation was trying to drive a wedge between Germany and Italy.
But now Mussolini was even more confused. The front line had clearly said it was resisting stubbornly, so why were the Germans saying that the Italian troops at the front had already surrendered?
More importantly, the Anglo-French-Australasian forces had only launched their