While Mussolini was busy making trouble for the royal family, the Anglo-French-Australasian side was not idle either.
Since Italian soldiers gave the coalition forces a chance to completely surround Tunis and Bizerte, the Central Powers' North African Joint Operations Department naturally would not let it slip.
On January 6, 1938, over 300,000 Anglo-French-Australasian troops rushed to Bizerte, attempting to completely block the retreat route of the German and Italian troops in the Tunis region in a short time.
As for that coastal salient of Tunis, once the encirclement was achieved, they would be unable to fly away.
The garrison troops stationed in Bizerte were originally fewer than 100,000 men from the Italian Army.
After all, Bizerte was not considered a strategic location compared to Tunis, and coupled with the fact that it was relatively close to Tunis, ports and airports naturally had not been built there.
Yet following the successive surrenders of the Italian Army, the German Army abruptly realized something was amiss.
To avoid being surrounded, while reporting to the German Supreme Command, the German Army had already planned to break out toward Bizerte and even Annaba to the west.
Once they escaped the Tunis region, the encirclement by the Anglo-French-Australasian Army would become virtually impossible to form. At the same time, the Constantine and Algiers regions also held many German and Italian garrisons, which, combined with the Spanish Army further west, could basically ensure the safety of this German corps in Africa.
Yet easier said than done.
Even though they knew clearly that breaking out from Bizerte could guarantee their safety, who could guarantee that there were no Anglo-French-Australasian troops already prepared around Bizerte?
This caused the German Army on the road to Bizerte to advance almost while reconnoitering the situation. Although the distance between Bizerte and Tunis