Both sides had very limited numbers. Leaving aside their respective stragglers, each had only five or six thousand men actually within the battlefield, and fewer still had entered the initial fighting: around four thousand on the Xianbei side, while only two or three thousand of the Imperial Army had rapidly joined battle.
This produced a strange spectacle rarely seen in warfare, ancient or modern-commanding troops in the midst of battle.
Yes, indeed. Before the Napoleonic Wars changed the shape of the battlefield, battlefield command had been a luxury for commanders throughout history and across the world.
With too many troops, you could not even see what was happening. How were you supposed to command them?
With too few, there was no room for command either. At most, before leading the charge, you could send half your men around the rear or into the flank.
And were you sure you could command your troops effectively?
The vast majority of so-called strategic ingenuity and command ability lay in strategy, marching, and prebattle deployment. During battle, beyond committing reserves and launching a general assault or pursuit at the right moment, there was little else to consider, much less repeated exchanges of moves.
In other words, what was tested more often was the ability to react on the spot and make the decisive final kick.
When Murong Ke saw Ran Min charging toward him, all he could do was stand there, watch how things developed, and consider when to run.
When Huan Wen fought Fu Xiong, he merely ordered the war chariots forward several hundred paces.
Several thousand men, comprising seven or eight fighting groups of four or five hundred each, happened to offer that rare, perfect scale of battle on which to display one's battlefield maneuvering.
First came deploying their formations. Murong De