Recaps

Nintendo executives reviewed the N64’s upcoming games, the Game Boy’s second-half lineup, and the N64’s promotional campaign ahead of E3. Yamauchi Hiroshi approved the Game Boy development budgets and a major advertising push, while Shigeru Miyamoto said the Super Mario 64 demo was ready.

• Genyo Takeda presented Strongest Habu Shogi, and Yamauchi Hiroshi asked what other N64 games Nintendo had in development.
• Shigeru Miyamoto outlined Wave Race 64 and Mario Kart 64, and Yamauchi Hiroshi urged the teams to keep the post-launch schedule tight.
• Yokoi Gunpei reported that Sega’s GamePocket had suppressed Game Boy shipments, then presented Yoshi's Magic Gem, Shiren the Wanderer GB, and Donkey Kong Land as second-half releases.
• Yamauchi Hiroshi approved the Game Boy budgets and told Nintendo to reassure third-party developers that it would continue supporting the handheld.
• Imanishi Hiroshi proposed television ads featuring Mario in a 3D world, and Yamauchi Hiroshi approved the promotion budget and demanded an E3 booth that would overpower Sega.
• Shigeru Miyamoto said Nintendo could set up one hundred E3 demo machines running Bob-omb Battlefield in Super Mario 64.

Nintendo approved a simultaneous N64 launch in Japan and North America and prepared an aggressive retail campaign to compete with Sega and Sony. Nakayama Takuya left Sega early after delegating much of his work, then found Kazuki gently helping care for baby Miki at home.

• Yamauchi Hiroshi approved Imanishi Hiroshi's plan for a simultaneous N64 launch in Japan and North America within two weeks of E3.
• Yamauchi Hiroshi ordered Nintendo to establish N64 demo areas in American Walmart and Best Buy stores and to prioritize black consoles at launch.
• Nakayama Takuya saw that Hisao Oguchi and Director Hoshino's Audit Committee were handling Sega's work effectively and left the office early.
• Nakayama Takuya returned home and learned that Eri, Nakayama Miyuki, and Kazuki were in the nursery with Miki.
• Kazuki gently touched Miki's clenched fist with a baby wipe while Eri and Nakayama Miyuki watched.

Kazuki doted on his baby sister Miki at home while Nakayama Takuya reviewed Sega’s Jupiter game adaptation of Ghost in the Shell. Takuya rejected Hisao Oguchi’s North American publicity plan, arguing that the adult cyberpunk film would receive too little theatrical exposure to support a costly tie-in campaign.

• Kazuki asked when Miki would grow up enough to hold a game controller, and his family laughed at his assumption that everyone liked video games.
• Nakayama Takuya visited Miki, compared her quiet nature with Kazuki’s energetic infancy, and watched her fall asleep.
• Hisao Oguchi showed Takuya the final test build of the Jupiter version of Ghost in the Shell.
• Takuya praised the game’s mobility and hacking mechanics after testing a stealth sequence.
• Oguchi proposed releasing the game in North America with a publicity campaign tied to the film’s theatrical run.
• Takuya rejected the plan, explaining that Ghost in the Shell would receive limited screenings and could not support the same tie-in strategy as Toy Story.

Nakayama Takuya convinced Hisao Oguchi that Resident Evil posed a major threat to Ghost in the Shell and that the game should avoid competing for attention during its release window. He proposed promoting Ghost in the Shell through North American videotape sales and rentals, where its core audience could engage with the film at their own pace.

• Nakayama Takuya warned Hisao Oguchi that Resident Evil's survival-horror design and Capcom's action-game expertise made it a serious competitor.
• Hisao Oguchi realized that Ghost in the Shell would struggle if released while Resident Evil's popularity was peaking in April and May.
• Nakayama Takuya proposed avoiding theatrical promotion and targeting Ghost in the Shell's audience through North American videotape rentals and sales.
• Nakayama Takuya explained that videotapes would let science-fiction and animation fans pause and replay the film, and Hisao Oguchi became receptive to the strategy.

Nakayama Takuya decided to time Ghost in the Shell’s release with Manga Entertainment’s North American videotape rollout and promote it to core players at E3. Hisao Oguchi investigated the timing and analyzed whether the game could withstand competition from the N64 launch, leaving the videotape market’s role in the strategy as the key unresolved link.

• Nakayama Takuya told Hisao Oguchi to release Ghost in the Shell alongside the videotape rollout and present it at E3 as a benchmark sci-fi tactical game.
• Hisao Oguchi contacted Sega of America and learned that the videotape rollout was scheduled for mid-July.
• Hisao Oguchi noticed the timing would put Ghost in the Shell near the N64 launch and questioned whether the game would be overshadowed.
• Hisao Oguchi compared the audiences for Super Mario 64 and Ghost in the Shell, concluding that their target players differed.
• Hisao Oguchi assessed Ghost in the Shell’s distinctive tactical stealth gameplay and turned to the North American videotape market as the plan’s crucial remaining factor.

Hisao Oguchi shifted Ghost in the Shell’s North American promotion toward core gaming media and Manga Entertainment’s videotape-rental network, arguing that its science-fiction audience and long-tail sales would avoid a direct fight with the N64 launch. As Sega prepared for the June release, weak theatrical box office confirmed the wisdom of separating the game’s promotion from the film’s cinema performance, while the story turned to Capcom Headquarters.

• Hisao Oguchi concluded that Manga Entertainment’s video-store network could connect Ghost in the Shell with science-fiction fans who did not follow gaming news.
• Hisao Oguchi told Sega of America to cut mass-market television advertising and coordinate standees in Blockbuster stores with Manga Entertainment.
• Hisao Oguchi ordered a dim, neon-lit E3 booth with a high-difficulty demo and instructed Sega to adjust production according to videotape-rental data.
• Hisao Oguchi received reports that Ghost in the Shell had earned dismal North American theater numbers, then set them aside as Sega’s videotape and June game-release plans proceeded.
• The narrative shifted from Sega Headquarters to Capcom Headquarters in Osaka.

Tsujimoto Kenzo arranged an urgent production run after Resident Evil sold out across North America, turning to Sega when Capcom’s own factories and Sony’s DADC could not meet demand. Sega used its Tijuana plant to rush discs into California, and Resident Evil continued to dominate the North American market over the following two weeks.

• The sales director told Tsujimoto Kenzo that North America’s initial 100,000 copies of Resident Evil had sold out in three days and retailers urgently needed restocks.
• The sales director reported that Capcom’s factories were fully booked and Sony’s DADC could not supply the requested 300,000 copies quickly.
• Tsujimoto Kenzo ordered negotiations with Sega for a rush production plan to deliver 300,000 copies to North American stores.
• Hisao Oguchi assigned the order to Sega’s Tijuana plant and promised the first shipment would cross into California on the morning of the third day.
• Tsujimoto Kenzo accepted Sega’s 15-percent rush premium and authorized the contract and payment.
• Sega’s Tijuana plant ran day and night, sending Resident Evil discs across the border as the game dominated North America for two weeks.

After Sega handled Capcom’s urgent Resident Evil order, Ken Kutaragi sought Sony chairman Norio Ohga’s approval to secure a PlayStation port. Ohga authorized generous terms, but Kutaragi knew Sony’s internal power struggle could obstruct his efforts.

• Hisao Oguchi learned Capcom planned to handle regular restocks itself after Sega fulfilled its urgent order, and he valued the trust the deal had earned.
• Ken Kutaragi learned Sega had taken Capcom’s urgent order because Sony’s DADC factory was fully booked, so he decided to meet Tsujimoto Kenzo and pursue a PlayStation port of Resident Evil.
• Ken Kutaragi considered how Sony’s leadership was distracted by internal conflicts, leaving him to manage PlayStation negotiations largely on his own.
• Norio Ohga authorized Ken Kutaragi to negotiate flexible royalties, lower disc-pressing costs, and access to Sony’s European distribution channels for Capcom.
• Ken Kutaragi left Norio Ohga’s office and headed to the president’s office, worried that Sony’s approval process and shifting power could hinder the deal.

Ken Kutaragi persuaded Nobuyuki Idei to approve concessions and Sony distribution support so he could negotiate with Capcom over bringing Resident Evil to PlayStation. He traveled to Osaka to meet Tsujimoto Kenzo, whose office was piled with North American sales reports.

• Ken Kutaragi told Nobuyuki Idei that Capcom had sent its Resident Evil rush order to Sega's Tijuana factory and warned that Capcom might shift toward Sega.
• Ken Kutaragi proposed reduced royalties and pressing fees, plus access to Sony's European distribution channels, to persuade Capcom to bring the game to PlayStation.
• Nobuyuki Idei approved the concessions, required Capcom to cover half the European promotion and distribution expenses, and arranged for Columbia Pictures to cooperate.
• Ken Kutaragi took Idei's memo and traveled to Osaka to negotiate with Tsujimoto Kenzo.
• Ken Kutaragi arrived at Capcom's headquarters and was led to Tsujimoto Kenzo's office.

Ken Kutaragi negotiated with Tsujimoto Kenzo to bring Resident Evil to PlayStation, offering lower royalties and disc costs alongside access to Sony’s European distribution network. Capcom agreed to begin the port the following week, and Sony announced the project a few days later.

• Ken Kutaragi asked Tsujimoto Kenzo to bring Resident Evil to PlayStation, and Tsujimoto cited Sega’s large install base and manufacturing support.
• Ken Kutaragi offered reduced royalties and disc-pressing costs, then proposed that Sony open its European publicity and distribution channels to Capcom.
• Tsujimoto Kenzo agreed, reasoning that a PlayStation port would give Capcom an alternative to relying too heavily on Sega.
• Tsujimoto Kenzo set the porting project to begin the following week and planned to send a representative to coordinate European distribution with Columbia Pictures.
• Sony announced Resident Evil for PlayStation a few days later, prompting reports from gaming media and discussion among players.

Nintendo prepared retailers for the N64 launch by displaying Super Mario 64 demos and requiring dealers to provide hands-on play areas. The chapter ended with Yamauchi Hiroshi reviewing regional reservation reports as demand outstripped the first shipment.

• Nishimura Masakazu replaced a Sega Sakura Wars poster at Nishimura Electric with an N64 sign announcing its June 23 release.
• Nishimura Masakazu watched students gather to admire the Super Mario 64 demo and its smooth 3D movement.
• Wholesalers and retail representatives gathered at Nintendo Headquarters for the First Heart Association’s annual dealer meeting and watched the N64 demo.
• Imanishi Hiroshi announced that launch allotments would prioritize traditional First Heart Association channels and require stores to set up hands-on demo areas.
• Imanishi Hiroshi refused requests for larger initial allocations and prohibited retailers from raising prices.
• Yamauchi Hiroshi reviewed reservation reports in his office while Nintendo’s first shipment remained constrained by production capacity and demand in Japan and North America.

Nintendo executives prepared for the N64 launch as demand rose, with Minoru Arakawa setting an aggressive North American retail and advertising strategy and approving a $199 price. The chapter leaves Nintendo scaling up production and readying storefront promotions ahead of the June launch.

• Yokoi Gunpei reported that the Uji Factory’s new production lines were running above a ninety-five percent yield and that Japan would stock 650,000 N64 units by month’s end.
• Yokoi Gunpei told Yamauchi Hiroshi that Minoru Arakawa had requested 800,000 units for the N64’s first month in North America.
• Minoru Arakawa ordered Nintendo of America to install trial-play machines in major retailers before June and approved an advertising budget thirty percent above plan.
• Howard Lincoln warned Minoru Arakawa against legally risky advertising claims about the N64’s 64-bit capabilities.
• Minoru Arakawa set the North American launch price at $199 and argued that Super Mario 64, store queues, and summer-vacation timing could help Nintendo regain attention from Sega and Sony.

Allen Adham and Mike Morhaime prepared Warcraft II and its Beyond the Dark Portal expansion for Windows 95, while Bill Roper oversaw new hotkeys and hero-centered campaign rules. In late April, a line formed outside an EB Games store in New York as the releases approached.

• Allen Adham reviewed reports showing players shifting from DOS to Windows 95, and Mike Morhaime said the game's Windows 95 conversion was nearly finished.
• Mike Morhaime said Warcraft II: Beyond the Dark Portal would launch alongside the Windows 95 base game, with Bill Roper's team completing balance tests.
• Bill Roper tested Nakayama Takuya's left-hand grid-mapping hotkeys, which helped testers issue commands faster while keeping their eyes on the screen.
• Bill Roper introduced hero units and required campaign missions to fail if a core hero died, despite a level designer's concerns about the rule's difficulty.
• In late April, a long line formed outside an EB Games store on Fifth Avenue in New York before it opened.

The Windows 95 release of Warcraft II: Black Tide and its expansion Dark Portal sold briskly, earning strong reviews for their improved controls and hero-centered campaigns. Blizzard’s success left the studio with million-plus combined sales and a new hotkey standard that players expected from RTS games.

• The store manager sold out of Dark Portal by midafternoon as veteran players bought the expansion and new Windows 95 users chose Warcraft II: Black Tide.
• Paul used the new grid hotkeys to outmaneuver his roommate in a network match, winning a decisive battle through faster unit control.
• A Chicago review editor completed Dark Portal’s human campaign by protecting Turalyon, Khadgar, and Alleria, then praised the expansion’s hero mechanics and epic missions.
• Allen Adham reviewed the first-week figures showing that the two releases had passed one million combined sales and were still growing.
• Mike Morhaime and Bill Roper reported high reviews, enthusiastic discussion of the heroes, and widespread praise for the improved controls.

With the 1996 E3 approaching, Hisao Oguchi oversaw Sega’s expanded booth and prepared its demos and business events while Nakayama Takuya planned to attend the UE engine agreement signing. The chapter also showed how E3 had become a major venue for game promotion and industry deals.

• Allen Adham thanked Sega’s Managing Director Nakayama for a suggestion that advanced Blizzard’s game and said Blizzard hoped to keep exchanging ideas with Sega.
• Hisao Oguchi coordinated Sega’s expanded E3 booth and confirmed Nakayama Takuya would arrive on May 16 and attend the event on May 17.
• Hisao Oguchi prepared a difficult Ghost in the Shell demo, intending to challenge media visitors and have knowledgeable commentators explain the gameplay on a big screen.
• Hisao Oguchi reviewed Nintendo’s planned Super Mario 64 showcase and Sony’s third-party lineup as companies prepared for the second E3.
• The owner of Rapid Click sought another $500,000 from an investor, who agreed to consider signing if the studio’s racing game demo maintained thirty frames per second.

Bandai brought a weak game lineup to E3 and focused its booth on toys, while Sega's Nakayama Takuya predicted Bandai would eventually seek a merger. The chapter left Sega preparing to use Bandai's future difficulties to pursue a partnership that could benefit both companies.

• At Bandai's E3 booth, Yakumo saw that Dragon Ball Z: The Great Dragon Ball Legend ran poorly and ordered staff to emphasize the Gundam models instead of the games.
• A Bandai employee questioned why the booth featured an old Gundam game, but Yakumo said upper management had ordered them to display it.
• In Tokyo, Hisao Oguchi told Nakayama Takuya that Bandai had reserved a large booth despite bringing only two games and many toys.
• Nakayama Takuya instructed Hisao Oguchi to give Bandai its requested space on the South Hall side aisle and leave its booth plans alone.
• Nakayama Takuya predicted that Bandai's traditional toy business and weak games division would lead it to seek a merger with Sega.

As the second E3 opened, third-party publishers backed Nintendo’s opening address to keep Sega and Sony from dominating the console market. Masayuki Uemura began his speech by honoring Atari and introducing the NES, leaving the audience awaiting his account of Nintendo’s effort to revive home consoles.

• Ken Kutaragi ordered Sony’s booth crew to raise the audio volume and move its demos beside the main aisle after Nintendo won the opening address.
• Larry Probst persuaded Electronic Arts executives to support Nintendo’s E3 prominence as leverage against Sega and Sony, while Nakayama Takuya had Sega abstain from the vote.
• The second E3 opened in Los Angeles on May 16, with reporters and industry figures filling the convention center and the central hall.
• Masayuki Uemura delivered the opening address, recognizing Atari’s role in bringing games into homes and criticizing its pursuit of quantity over software quality.
• Masayuki Uemura introduced the NES as the machine Nintendo brought to North America in 1985 and described the challenge of reassuring retailers after Atari’s collapse.

As the second E3 approached, Hisao Oguchi prepared Sega’s exhibition while Nakayama Takuya dismissed Bandai’s prospects and prioritized the UE engine open-source community. Nintendo secured the opening address after third-party members voted overwhelmingly for it, leaving Ken Kutaragi frustrated with Sony’s poor showing.

• Nakayama Takuya told Hisao Oguchi to treat Bandai as an ordinary exhibitor and focus Sega’s E3 efforts on the UE engine open-source community.
• Hisao Oguchi checked Sega’s South Hall setup and saw Bandai representatives ignoring the game demo at their booth.
• Sega, Sony, and Nintendo prepared their displays as the second E3 neared, while Masayuki Uemura checked the main stage for Nintendo’s opening speech.
• Ken Kutaragi courted third-party companies to win Sony the opening address and offered a five-minute game montage in exchange for their votes.
• Electronic Arts, Capcom, Konami, Hudson, and other members voted for Nintendo, giving Sony less than twenty percent of the vote.
• Ken Kutaragi crumpled the results fax and threw it into the wastebasket.

Masayuki Uemura presented Nintendo’s view that good games and satisfying controls mattered more than hardware specifications, and announced that the N64 would release on June 23. After his speech, reporters headed to Nintendo’s West Hall booth to try the console and its analog stick.

• Masayuki Uemura described Nintendo’s past approach to quality control and the SNES’s shoulder buttons before introducing the N64.
• Masayuki Uemura explained the N64’s hardware features and why Nintendo had insisted on adding an analog stick for precise movement in 3D games.
• Masayuki Uemura argued that a console’s purpose was to deliver a distinctive, enjoyable experience and announced the N64’s June 23 release.
• Larry Probst discussed Nintendo’s statement with a vice president as reporters packed up after the speech.
• A GamePro editor and photographer left for the West Hall, where the editor planned to test Nintendo’s N64 and analog stick.

The N64 launch demos gave reporters hands-on experience with Super Mario 64, while Sony and Sega drew crowds with their game exhibits. Masayuki Uemura later unveiled the N64 prototype and detailed its 64-bit processor and hardware-level Z-buffering.

• A GamePro editor tried Super Mario 64 and praised the analog stick's smooth control, while noting it could make his thumb sore.
• The editor played Sega's Ghost in the Shell demo, died repeatedly, then used stealth and hacking to clear a stage and praised the game's depth.
• Masayuki Uemura returned to the stage and revealed the N64 prototype to the audience.
• Masayuki Uemura announced that the N64 had a custom 64-bit SGI processor running at 93.75 megahertz and hardware-level Z-buffering.

Masayuki Uemura announced the N64’s June 23, 1996 worldwide launch and its $199 American price, drawing cheers and concern from rivals. He then introduced Shigeru Miyamoto, who revealed a redesigned controller with an analog stick as the focus shifted to the console’s games and controls.

• Masayuki Uemura highlighted the N64’s hardware features while critics noted its limited cartridge storage capacity.
• Masayuki Uemura announced the N64’s worldwide launch date and prices of 25,000 yen in Japan and $199 in America.
• Probst and the GamePro editor recognized that Nintendo’s $199 price matched its rivals despite the N64’s powerful hardware.
• Sony North America’s executives grew grim as the N64’s price erased the PlayStation’s expected price advantage.
• Masayuki Uemura introduced Shigeru Miyamoto, who displayed a redesigned controller with an analog stick in the upper-left position.

Shigeru Miyamoto demonstrated Nintendo’s redesigned controller and Super Mario 64’s fluid 3D movement system to a captivated audience. He ended by showing Mario leap into a painting that served as a stage entrance.

• Shigeru Miyamoto explained that Nintendo had scrapped the Trident controller after comparing it with Sega Jupiter’s design and had settled on an asymmetrical controller with a main stick, action buttons, and trigger buttons.
• Shigeru Miyamoto demonstrated how the analog stick controlled Mario’s movement speed and showed Mario braking, climbing, performing jumps, and rebounding off a wall.
• Shigeru Miyamoto showed Mario swimming underwater, shaking off water, and using a crouch-and-jump combination to backflip onto a balcony.
• Shigeru Miyamoto invited players to discover more moves for themselves, then guided Mario into the castle hall.
• Shigeru Miyamoto explained that stage entrances in a 3D world could take many forms, and Mario jumped into a painting of a bomb pirate ship.

Shigeru Miyamoto demonstrated Super Mario 64 and Wave Race 64 at Nintendo’s N64 presentation, drawing crowds toward the West Hall demo booth. As the hall emptied, veteran media editors remained behind, anticipating that the year’s main event would be PC technology and Windows 95.

• Shigeru Miyamoto demonstrated Super Mario 64’s open 3D gameplay, including throwing a Bob-omb, using cannons, and collecting a star.
• Shigeru Miyamoto presented Wave Race 64, showing how waves affected watercraft movement, speed, and balance, and announced its September 1996 release date.
• Shigeru Miyamoto invited attendees to try the games at Nintendo’s West Hall demo area and left the stage to thunderous applause.
• Reporters and editors hurried to Nintendo’s booth to play Super Mario 64, and a long queue quickly formed.
• A senior editor from Computer Gaming World argued that PC technology and Windows 95’s rapid spread would be the year’s real main event.

Brett Sperry unveiled Command & Conquer: Red Alert at E3, showcasing its alternate-history war, sea-land-air combat, and new units. He announced a late October 1996 release for MS-DOS and Windows 95, with LAN matches supporting up to eight players.

• Brett Sperry argued that Command & Conquer had proven the popularity of real-time strategy after selling more than one million copies, and said its expansion had broken first-week sales records.
• Brett presented a trailer showing a time experiment triggering an unknown divergence and a new war fought across sea, land, and air.
• The trailer introduced Tanya, an Allied commando who could destroy buildings but could not fight tanks.
• Brett announced that Command & Conquer: Red Alert would release in late October 1996 for MS-DOS and Windows 95, with LAN matches supporting up to eight players.
• The audience applauded, and the media stayed behind to organize their thoughts and discuss the game.

At E3, reporters compared Blizzard and Westwood’s competing RTS designs before Konami presented its upcoming games. Konami drew little interest from Western journalists with its Tokimeki Memorial spin-offs, while Vandal Hearts attracted some attention, though none of the announced games had playable demos.

• Reporters discussed how Blizzard and Westwood differed in RTS controls, pacing, and campaign character design.
• Konami’s North American division head introduced a lineup of Tokimeki Memorial spin-offs for Jupiter and PlayStation.
• Western journalists dismissed the romance-game spin-offs as a poor fit for the North American market.
• The executive unveiled Vandal Hearts, describing how 3D terrain elevation and rear attacks would affect battles.
• The executive announced that none of the showcased games had demos, prompting complaints from the audience.