Recaps

Takuya investigated Bandai’s influence over Sunrise’s refusal to license anime IPs and discovered a family connection to Bandai shareholder Mitsui Chuta. At their meeting, Chuta confirmed Bandai was behind the obstacle and considered Sega’s proposed exchange of interests potentially profitable.

• Takuya found that Mitsui Chuta held shares in both Bandai and Sony, then learned from Nakayama Miyuki that Chuta was her distant cousin.
• Takuya asked his grandfather to arrange an introduction, and a week later he met Mitsui Chuta at a Ginza teahouse.
• Takuya asked whether Bandai had influenced Sunrise’s refusal to license its IPs, and Mitsui Chuta confirmed that it had.
• Takuya offered an exchange of interests in return for Bandai ceasing to obstruct Sega’s licensing deals with Sunrise and Toei Animation.
• Mitsui Chuta said Bandai’s board could accept the deal if Sega’s offer was appealing, since their businesses had little direct competition.

Takuya proposed making a Sega game for Sony’s struggling LaserDisc player to persuade Mitsui Chuta to help secure licensing from Sunrise and Toei. Mitsui agreed to clear the licensing obstacles if the game could effectively boost LD sales, and Takuya promised to prepare a proposal.

• Mitsui Chuta said Bandai would benefit from Takuya’s plan but asked what direct benefit it offered him personally.
• Takuya pointed out Mitsui Chuta’s stake in Sony and proposed that Sega create a game specifically for Sony.
• Takuya suggested pairing the game with Sony’s LaserDisc player, which had advanced technology but disappointing sales.
• Mitsui Chuta offered to resolve the Sunrise and Toei licensing issues if Takuya’s game could drive LD sales.
• Takuya thanked Mitsui Chuta and said he would prepare a detailed proposal for both companies to evaluate.

Takuya presented Sega’s promotional game proposal for Sony’s LD player to Sony executives, including Ken Kutaragi, after securing signed confidentiality agreements. The chapter ended with the Sony representatives reacting with intense interest as they read the proposal.

• Takuya reflected on the risks and opportunities of drawing Sony deeper into the game industry through Sega’s proposed LD game.
• A week later, Takuya arrived at Sony headquarters with Masao Suzuki, Yoshikawa, and legal staff to meet Mitsui Chuta, Shigeo Maruyama, and Ken Kutaragi.
• Takuya had Sony’s three representatives sign Sega’s strict confidentiality agreement before revealing the proposal.
• Masao Suzuki distributed the proposals, and Takuya stayed silent to observe the Sony executives’ reactions.
• Ken Kutaragi read with growing fascination, Shigeo Maruyama scrutinized Takuya with increasing admiration, and Mitsui Chuta recognized that the proposal was extraordinary.

Sony’s executives debated Takuya’s LD game proposal and tried to buy it outright, but Takuya countered with alternatives that could benefit Sony’s competitors. Sony agreed to joint development with Sega, leaving the parties to negotiate the terms.

• Ken Kutaragi called Shigeo Maruyama and Mitsui Chuta into a private room and argued that Sony’s technology made Takuya’s proposal an ideal project for LD.
• Maruyama and Mitsui agreed that Sony should secure the project and instructed Mitsui to offer Takuya twenty million US dollars for a buyout.
• Takuya rejected the offer, explaining that the proposal’s strategic and commercial value mattered to Sega as well as Sony.
• Ken Kutaragi warned that Sega would struggle to realize the proposal without Sony’s technical support.
• Takuya pointed to possible cooperation with Columbia Records and Philips, prompting Sony to abandon its buyout attempt.
• Mitsui proposed joint development, and Sony and Sega reached an agreement in principle while leaving control and revenue terms to further negotiation.

Takuya and Sony finalized their cooperation agreement after a week of negotiations, while Mitsui Chuta secured a meeting with Bandai’s President Yamashina Makoto. The chapter left Takuya preparing to meet Yamashina next Wednesday with Mitsui.

• Takuya asked Mitsui Chuta about progress on cooperation with Bandai, and Mitsui promised that talks were moving forward.
• Mitsui tested Takuya’s interest in Sony holding Sega shares, but Takuya said he had no authority to discuss the company’s equity.
• After a week of negotiations, Director Yoshikawa and Takuya signed the agreement with Sony at its headquarters.
• Mitsui told Takuya that Yamashina Makoto had agreed to meet them at Bandai headquarters next Wednesday, and Mitsui would accompany him.

Takuya met Bandai president Yamashina Makoto to ask for help securing game adaptation rights to Sunrise works, including Mobile Suit Gundam. He offered Sega’s technical support for a joint robot fighting game in exchange, and Yamashina began to consider the proposal.

• Takuya met Yamashina Makoto at Bandai headquarters, with Mitsui Chuta present to facilitate the meeting.
• Takuya asked Bandai to help Sega obtain game adaptation rights to Sunrise titles such as Mobile Suit Gundam.
• Yamashina asked what Sega would offer in return, and Takuya asked Director Kobayashi to assess Bandai’s ability to make a fighting game at Fatal Fury’s level.
• Kobayashi admitted Bandai lacked the technical experience to match Sega’s fighting games in the short term.
• Takuya offered Sega’s Fatal Fury technical framework and support to jointly develop a high-quality robot fighting game.
• Takuya assured Yamashina that Sega’s licenses would not undermine Bandai’s interests in Sunrise merchandise, and Yamashina grew interested in the opportunity.

Takuya secured a cooperation framework with Bandai by offering Pokémon model rights in exchange for help obtaining Toei robot anime game adaptation rights. On the ride back to Sega, he explained why he was holding off on inviting Bandai to develop games for Sega’s new console, then turned to a more serious topic.

• Takuya offered Bandai the chance to design and produce Pokémon assembly models, and Yamashina Makoto agreed to cooperate.
• A Bandai executive asked for independent design, production, and sales rights for Pokémon models.
• Takuya asked Bandai to use its relationship with Toei Animation to help Sega obtain game adaptation rights to robot anime including Mazinger Z, Getter Robo, and Super Electromagnetic Robot Combattler V; Yamashina accepted the condition.
• Bandai and Sega agreed on a cooperation framework, initialed the contract, and Sega’s team left Bandai headquarters.
• Masao Suzuki asked why Takuya had not recruited Bandai as a partner for Sega’s new console, and Takuya explained that Bandai’s Nintendo ties, developing game capabilities, and the risk of harming robot IPs made it too soon.
• Takuya said Sega’s new console would be the best platform for the robot fighting game, then his tone and gaze sharpened as he shifted to another subject.

Takuya coordinated Sega’s console plans, its LD game project with Sony, and production of the first Pokémon theatrical film while maneuvering around rival companies and third-party developers. The PC Engine was publicly revealed with powerful graphics, emerging as an early competitor to Sega’s secretly developing Mega Drive.

• Takuya told Masao Suzuki to quietly investigate Hudson and NEC’s rumored console partnership and considered leaking the news to distract Nintendo.
• Takuya worked with Ken Kutaragi on Sega and Sony’s LD game project, while Sega pursued third-party support for its new console.
• Takuya delivered the Mewtwo Strikes Back script to GALLOP and instructed the studio to produce the film to the highest standard with Sega’s support.
• Japanese game media revealed the PC Engine’s specifications and graphics, presenting it as a quasi-16-bit console and shaking the industry.

Yamauchi Hiroshi retaliated against Hudson and tightened Nintendo’s control over third-party developers after the PC Engine appeared. Takuya saw Nintendo’s harsh response as an opportunity for Sega to secretly develop its new console and attract publishers dissatisfied with Nintendo’s terms.

• Yamauchi Hiroshi ordered Nintendo to remove Hudson from its certified third-party list and end all cooperation with the company.
• Yamauchi Hiroshi gave Nintendo’s other third-party developers one week to submit six-month game development plans and release schedules.
• Masao Suzuki warned Takuya that Nintendo’s actions could frighten developers away from working with Sega, but Takuya said the backlash could push dissatisfied publishers toward a more equal platform.
• Namco submitted a detailed second-half Famicom release plan to Nintendo, including R.B.I. Baseball, as a show of loyalty.
• Sega released previously completed arcade games to maintain its public appearance of focusing on arcades while its new console project remained secret.

Nakayama Takuya met with Sony to discuss their LD arcade game project, while Ken Kutaragi probed Sega’s lack of activity in the home console market. Sony presented Michael Jackson’s “Bad” master tape and choreographer LaVelle Smith Jr. to help develop the game’s dance content, and Takuya pushed for the game to recreate Jackson’s look in detail.

• Ken Kutaragi asked Nakayama Takuya why Sega appeared uninterested in the home console market, and Takuya said Sega was focused on its profitable arcade business.
• Ken Kutaragi told Takuya that Sony’s hardware assembly was nearly complete and asked when Sega would deliver the game’s interactive video content.
• Ken Kutaragi introduced choreographer LaVelle Smith Jr. and revealed that Sony Music had obtained a master tape of Michael Jackson’s title track “Bad.”
• Nakayama Takuya enthusiastically discussed the game’s dance design with LaVelle Smith Jr., who played a rhythm and demonstrated improvised choreography.
• Nakayama Takuya asked Ken Kutaragi to ensure the game’s costumes and props recreated Michael Jackson’s “Bad” music-video look down to the details.

Nintendo’s special officers pressured third-party developers as Sega worked to deepen their resentment. At Konami, Hideo Kojima’s dispute with Kazuo Okada ended with Okada transferred, but Kojima forced to apologize and submit a self-criticism.

• Yamauchi Hiroshi sent special officers to monitor Nintendo’s third-party developers, while Nakayama Takuya arranged for Sega’s informants to quietly widen tensions.
• Kazuo Okada demanded that Hideo Kojima simplify Metal Gear for a possible Famicom port, and a Sega informant at Konami defended the MSX2 game’s distinctive complexity.
• Kojima refused to abandon Metal Gear’s stealth gameplay and deep story, while Konami managers sided with Okada over concerns about sales.
• Kozuki Kagemasa called Nintendo to mediate, but Yokoi Gunpei dismissed the dispute and supported Nintendo’s authority.
• Konami transferred Kazuo Okada, while Kojima had to write a self-criticism and apologize to Yokoi Gunpei for talking back.

Hideo Kojima clashed with Konami over Nintendo liaison Nishida’s efforts to reshape Metal Gear, was fired after demanding creative freedom, and saw the project shelved. Sega’s Takuya sent Masao Suzuki to recruit him, and Kojima agreed to join Sega.

• Nishida repeatedly urged Hideo Kojima to simplify Metal Gear for mass-market players, including changing a key scene about Snake’s betrayal.
• Hideo Kojima confronted Kozuki Kagemasa and demanded the freedom to develop Metal Gear according to his vision, threatening to leave Konami.
• Kozuki Kagemasa refused to change company policy, and Konami fired Hideo Kojima, shelved the MSX2 project, and assigned it to another producer.
• Masao Suzuki told Takuya that Hideo Kojima had been fired, and Takuya ordered him to recruit Kojima with promises of creative freedom and full support.
• Masao Suzuki met Hideo Kojima at a café and offered him a place at Sega, and Kojima accepted.

Nakayama Takuya welcomed Hideo Kojima to Sega and praised his Metal Gear script, promising creative freedom and support. He warned that Konami’s partial rights to the IP made an immediate release risky, then invited Kojima to see Sega’s secret projects.

• Nakayama Takuya greeted Hideo Kojima and read his Metal Gear script, praising its story and Solid Snake’s characterization.
• Takuya promised Kojima creative freedom and Sega’s support for reasonable funding, technology, and staffing needs.
• Takuya explained that Konami still held part of Metal Gear’s rights and might release its own modified version, creating legal risks for Sega.
• Kojima accepted that he could not begin his original Metal Gear project yet, while Takuya said Sega would explore recovering the rights.
• Takuya invited Kojima to look at Sega’s secret projects, piquing his curiosity.

Hideo Kojima saw Sega’s 16-bit console prototype and became eager to create games for it, while Takuya examined the hardware’s high production cost and sought ways to improve it. The chapter ended with Takuya studying a component-by-component cost report.

• Takuya brought Hideo Kojima into Sega’s Hardware Development Department, where he watched a demo showcasing the new console’s graphics and processing capabilities.
• Hideo Kojima asked whether the console could achieve the demo’s effects, and Takuya encouraged him to begin planning games for the platform.
• Takuya introduced Hideo Kojima to the development teams and left him to explore the hardware and talk with the technicians.
• Takuya attended a hardware meeting, where the department head reported an estimated production cost of 26,000 yen per console.
• Takuya requested a breakdown of the major component costs and began reviewing the report for possible savings.

Nakayama Takuya discussed the new console’s high production cost with Directors Terauchi and Hatano, proposing ways to reduce it without sacrificing performance. He left them considering a broader plan to secure cheaper, more resilient chip supplies by encouraging Japanese suppliers to expand production in Taiwan.

• Nakayama Takuya presented an estimated unit production cost of 26,000 yen, and Directors Terauchi and Hatano warned that the expense could leave the console uncompetitive against Nintendo’s Famicom.
• Nakayama said the hardware department would explore substitute components and supply-chain improvements, then proposed outsourcing labor-intensive parts and assembly work to factories in Dongguan.
• Nakayama explained that the console’s MC68000 and Z80 chips still had to come from Japanese suppliers because nearby manufacturers lacked the necessary experience and licensing.
• Nakayama cited pressure on Japan’s semiconductor industry after the Toshiba incident and proposed encouraging suppliers to move some lower-end chip production to Taiwan.
• Nakayama named TSMC and UMC as potential partners for licensed chip manufacturing, and Terauchi and Hatano agreed the proposal deserved detailed study.

Nakayama Takuya proposed negotiating with Toshiba for bundled MC68000 and Z80 chip purchases to secure a low price for Sega’s new console. Director Terauchi and Director Hatano agreed to proceed with his plan, pending a demonstration of the launch games and a board vote.

• Nakayama Takuya explained why NEC, Hitachi, and Sharp were unsuitable suppliers and identified Toshiba as the best option for both chips.
• He proposed using a combined order of 600,000 chips to negotiate a bundled price with Toshiba.
• Nakayama Takuya said Sega could raise the order to one million chips if Toshiba would not offer a sufficiently low price.
• He assured Director Terauchi and Director Hatano that the new console’s games could support the large order and offered to arrange a demonstration before procurement.
• Director Terauchi and Director Hatano agreed to support Nakayama Takuya’s negotiations with Toshiba.

Nakayama Takuya proposed a low-resource memory management program to make Sega’s new console easier for third-party developers to use. After winning the development leads’ support, he told Department Head Nakamura that he wanted to develop an entirely new handheld game console.

• Nakayama Takuya returned to the Hardware Development Department after sending Director Terauchi and Director Hatano to inspect factories in Hong Kong and contact semiconductor companies in Taiwan.
• Nakayama Takuya proposed forming a task force to design an optional memory management program for Sega’s new console.
• Yu Suzuki, Yuji Naka, and the other development leads supported the proposal, and Nakayama Takuya asked them to select task-force members within a week.
• Nakayama Takuya visited Department Head Nakamura and introduced his idea for developing an all-new handheld game console.

Nakayama Takuya proposed that Sega explore a cartridge-based handheld console, and Department Head Nakamura agreed to organize a small team for a preliminary technical assessment. The chapter left the project as a strategic reserve, with Takuya hoping Sega could launch a powerful backlit handheld before Nintendo.

• Nakayama Takuya outlined a handheld console with replaceable cartridges, a low-power Z80 processor, a switchable backlit LCD, compact design, and easy development.
• Department Head Nakamura raised concerns about the cost and battery drain of the backlight, heat dissipation, chip supply, and the hardware department’s limited resources.
• Nakayama Takuya framed the proposal as preliminary research for a future mobile platform rather than an immediate demand for large-scale development.
• Department Head Nakamura agreed to assemble a small evaluation team to assess technical feasibility and possible prototype designs.
• Nakayama Takuya planned to use promising research results to seek approval later and aim to beat Nintendo to a high-performance backlit handheld.

Sega and Sony executives watched a demonstration of the Bad dance arcade game at Sony headquarters, where music, lights, and footstep feedback transformed the lab into a disco-like stage. The demo ended with the sound engineer earning a high score and Nakayama Takuya seeing the immersive effect he had hoped for.

• Director Yoshikawa, Nakayama Takuya, and Masao Suzuki arrived at Sony's specially equipped laboratory, where Mitsui Chuta, Shigeo Maruyama, and Ken Kutaragi were waiting.
• A Sega developer loaded the Bad dance data into the arcade cabinet, and a Sony Music sound engineer volunteered to play.
• The sound engineer started the game, triggering its READY and GO display, synchronized stage lights, and Michael Jackson's Bad soundtrack.
• He followed LaVelle Smith Jr.'s on-screen dance and earned mostly Great ratings, with occasional Perfects that set off brighter lights.
• The engineer finished with a high step-accuracy score as the young employees swayed to the music, and Nakayama Takuya recognized the intended appeal of the game.

LaVelle Smith Jr. demonstrated the dance game with a flawless performance that revealed its full potential and won over the Sega and Sony executives. Nakayama Takuya saw the project’s success confirmed as the room erupted in celebration.

• LaVelle Smith Jr. stepped onto the platform and began dancing to the game’s music.
• Smith matched every cue perfectly, earning only “Perfect!” evaluations as the lighting effects followed his movements.
• Sega and Sony staff cheered and celebrated Smith’s performance together.
• Director Yoshikawa, Masao Suzuki, Shigeo Maruyama, Chuta Mitsunami, and Ken Kutaragi recognized the game’s appeal and commercial potential.
• Ken Kutaragi praised Sega’s ability to surprise others, and Nakayama Takuya realized the LD arcade project had largely succeeded.

After Smith’s performance, Nakayama Takuya named the arcade game Dance Dance Revolution and outlined ways to expand its appeal through music, idol groups, and character collaborations. Sony Music and the other executives embraced his ideas and began discussing the game’s content and marketing potential.

• Smith finished his dance performance, thrilling the gathered employees and executives.
• Mitsui Chuta and Director Yoshikawa asked Nakayama Takuya to give the game a memorable name, and he proposed Dance Dance Revolution.
• Shigeo Maruyama pledged Sony Music’s songs and artists to support DDR.
• Nakayama Takuya suggested adding popular female idol songs and dances to attract young women and build a social player community.
• Nakayama Takuya proposed collaborations with beloved characters such as Pokémon, inspiring the executives with the idea of mascot dances.

Nakayama Takuya proposed that Sega and Sony jointly hold a second esports tournament featuring a Dance Dance Revolution Global City Championship, and executives from both companies agreed to begin preparations. As Sega’s delegation left Sony Headquarters, Yoshikawa praised Nakayama, who said Sega should use Sony’s strengths while ensuring Sony contributed its share.

• Nakayama Takuya proposed that Sega and Sony jointly host the Second Esports Tournament and Dance Dance Revolution Global City Championship.
• Yoshikawa, Mitsui Chuta, and Shigeo Maruyama embraced the plan, discussing qualifiers, global finals, Sony Music performers, and promotional opportunities.
• Yoshikawa ordered the formation of a joint organizing committee, and Mitsui Chuta pledged Sony’s full support.
• Sega and Sony staff began planning tournament logistics, DDR updates, marketing, and performances, while LaVele Smith Jr. offered to help with dance content and promotion.
• Yoshikawa and Mitsui Chuta approved the prototype demonstration and cooperation plans, then shook hands as Sega’s delegation prepared to leave.
• In the car back to Sega Headquarters, Yoshikawa praised Nakayama, who said Sega should benefit from Sony’s resources while expecting Sony to show its own commitment.

Sega and Sony rapidly organized their DDR collaboration, while a controlled leak and Akemi Ishii’s evasive comments about CHA-CHA-CHA sent public anticipation soaring. At Nintendo, Yamauchi Hiroshi and his executives recognized the scale of the partnership but hesitated to interfere with such powerful rivals.

• Sega and Sony formed a joint committee and mobilized Sony Music staff, artists, and Pokémon mascot performers to prepare DDR’s music, choreography, and stages.
• Rumors about Sega and Sony’s secret project spread through the media as both companies’ public relations teams declined to confirm or deny the reports.
• Reporters confronted Akemi Ishii outside Sony headquarters, and she avoided confirming whether CHA-CHA-CHA would appear in the game.
• The interview fueled public excitement, drawing even people who had paid little attention to games toward the mysterious dance arcade machine.
• Yamauchi Hiroshi heard that Nakayama Takuya and Shigeo Maruyama were leading the collaboration and concluded Nintendo could not safely obstruct it.

Nintendo's executives worried that Sega and Bandai's new robot fighting game would strengthen Sega's arcade dominance, but Super Robot Grand Assembly quickly became a hit. Nakayama Takuya saw players flock to the game despite its glaring character imbalances, while Sega and Bandai profited from the collaboration.

• Nintendo executives reported that Sega and Bandai had completed Super Robot Grand Assembly, and Yamauchi Hiroshi acknowledged that Nintendo had few ways to restrain the arcade project.
• Sega and Bandai released Super Robot Grand Assembly in Japanese arcades with modest promotion, featuring familiar robots in a fighting game built on Fatal Fury's framework.
• Bandai prioritized recognizable robots, faithful moves, and a quick release over careful balance, leaving some characters far stronger than others.
• Nakayama Takuya visited arcades in Shinjuku and Akihabara and watched excited players repeatedly spend coins on the game, even after losing to overpowered robots.
• Super Robot Grand Assembly earned rich profits for Sega and Bandai, bolstered Sega's arcade position, and demonstrated the commercial power of combining famous IP with established game technology.

Sega demonstrated the new console’s launch lineup to persuade its directors to support Nakayama Takuya’s million-chip procurement plan. The board approved the order by a large majority and assigned Director Terauchi and Director Hatano to negotiate with Toshiba.

• Director Terauchi and Director Hatano returned from Hong Kong and Taiwan without revealing details of their trip, then brought Nakayama Takuya’s procurement plan before the board.
• Sega’s internal teams and partners demonstrated arcade ports, Compile’s Joy Island Adventure, Square’s Final Fantasy, Sega’s Phantasy Star, and Development Group 8’s The First Super Robot Wars.
• Nakayama Takuya explained that Sega would stagger the releases of Final Fantasy and Phantasy Star to sustain market interest and avoid competition between the games.
• Director Terauchi argued that ordering one million chips would lower costs and establish a favorable benchmark for future procurement.
• The directors approved buying five hundred thousand MC68000 chips and five hundred thousand Z80 chips from Toshiba, with two directors abstaining.
• The board appointed Director Terauchi and Director Hatano to negotiate the order with Toshiba Corporation.